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ABSTRACT
We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of flows of capital from rich to
poor countries the "Lucas Paradox." The theoretical explanations include differences in fundamentals
across countries and capital market imperfections. We show that during 1970-2000 low institutional
quality is the leading explanation. For example, improving Peru's institutional quality to Australia's
level, implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions
for achieving higher levels of income, but remain silent on the specific mechanisms. Our results














The standard neoclassical theory predicts that capital should °ow from rich to poor countries.
Under the usual assumptions of countries producing the same goods with the same constant returns
to scale production technology using capital and labor as factors of production, di®erences in income
per capita re°ect di®erences in capital per capita. Thus, if capital were allowed to °ow freely, new
investments would occur only in the poorer economy, and this would continue to be true until the
return to investments were equalized in all the countries. However, in his now classic example,
Lucas (1990) compares the U.S. and India in 1988 and demonstrates that, if the neoclassical model
were true, the marginal product of capital in India should be about 58 times that of the U.S. In
face of such return di®erentials, all capital should °ow from the U.S. to India. In practice, we
do not observe such °ows. Lucas questions the validity of the assumptions that give rise to these
di®erences in the marginal product of capital and asks what assumptions should replace these.
According to Lucas, this is the central question of economic development.
Lucas' work has generated an extensive theoretical literature. Researchers, including Lucas
himself, show that with slight modi¯cations of the standard neoclassical theory, the \Paradox"
disappears. These theoretical explanations for the \Lucas Paradox" can be grouped into two
categories. The ¯rst group includes di®erences in fundamentals that a®ect the production structure
of the economy, such as technological di®erences, missing factors of production, government policies,
and the institutional structure.1 The second group of explanations focuses on international capital
market imperfections, mainly sovereign risk and asymmetric information. Although capital has a
high return in developing countries, it does not go there because of the market failures.2 According
to Lucas, international capital market failures, or \political risk" as he puts it, cannot explain the
lack of °ows before 1945 since during that time most of the \third world" was subject to European
legal arrangements imposed through colonialism. Hence, investors in the developed countries, such
as the U.K., could expect contracts to be enforced in the same way in both the U.K. and India.3
1See King and Rebelo (1993), Razin and Yuen (1994), Gomme (1993), and Tornell and Velasco (1992). Lucas
¯nds that accounting for the di®erences in human capital quality across countries signi¯cantly reduces the return
di®erentials and considering the role of human capital externalities eliminates the return di®erentials. However,
his calculations assume that the externalities from the country's stock of human capital accrue entirely to the pro-
ducers within the country, i.e., all knowledge spillovers are local. This assumption is at odds with the evidence of
quantitatively signi¯cant international knowledge spillovers; see Helpman (2004).
2See Gertler and Rogo® (1990) and Gordon and Bovenberg (1996).
3Before 1945 European imperial powers granted trading rights to monopoly companies, an action that created
one-way °ows. In theory a large capital exporting economy can limit capital °ows in order to push interest rates in a
favorable direction. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) note that there is little evidence of large countries restrict capital
°ows for this purpose.
1However, the British institutions in India do not necessarily have the same quality as the British
institutions in the U.S. and Australia. As shown by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002),
if European settlement was discouraged by diseases or if surplus extraction was more bene¯cial,
then the European colonizers set up an institutional structure where the protection of property
rights was weak.
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the role of the di®erent theoretical explanations
for the lack of °ows of capital from rich countries to poor countries in a systematic empirical
framework.4 We show that during the period 1970¡2000 low institutional quality is the leading
explanation for the \Lucas Paradox." The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates show that im-
proving the quality of institutions to the U.K.'s level from that of Turkey's implies a 60% increase in
foreign investment. The instrumental variable (IV) estimates imply an even larger e®ect: improving
Peru's institutional quality to Australia's level, implies a quadrupling of foreign investment.5
An excellent example for the role of institutional quality in attracting foreign capital is Intel's
decision to locate in Costa Rica in 1996.6 In the ¯nal stage of the decision process, the short list
included Mexico and Costa Rica. The two countries have similar GDP per capita in U.S. dollars
(close to $3000 at that time), albeit Mexico is a much larger country. Both countries have similar
levels of adult literacy rates. However, given the overall size of Intel's investment relative to the
size of the economy, one important concern in the decision process was the absolute availability of
engineers and technically trained graduates, which favored Mexico. Hence, one cannot argue that
human capital was a de¯ning issue in Intel's ¯nal choice. Instead, Costa Rica's stability and lower
corruption levels tilted the balance in favor of the country. As noted by Spar (1998), Mexico's o®er
to make \exceptions" to the existing rules for Intel only in contrast to Costa Rica's approach of
making any concession made to Intel available to all other investors was an important reason in the
¯nal decision. Another example is the recent boom in foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey.
This boom is similar to what Portugal and Greece observed after joining in the EU. Turkey became
an o±cial accession country on October 3rd, 2005 and started entry negotiations. In a recent
article, Champion and von Reppert-Bismarck (2005), argue that these o±cial entry negotiations
would force Turkey to become more like the \EU countries" in its banking sector, its antitrust law,
its regulation, and its policies, which in turn will attract foreign investment. Turkey has undertaken
4Obstfeld (1995) argues that the most direct approach would be to compare capital's rate of return in di®erent
countries. Unfortunately, it is di±cult to ¯nd internationally comparable measures of after tax returns to capital.
5Both Turkey and Peru are in the bottom 25th percentile in the distribution of the index of institutions, whereas
Australia and the U.K. are in the top 75th percentile.
6See Spar (1998) and Larrain, Lopez-Calva and Rodriguez-Clare (2000).
2major institutional reform and constitutional change in the past 2 years, including the 2003 FDI law
that cuts the o±cial procedures from 15 to 3 for foreign investors. Multinational companies such as
Metro AG, PSA Peugeot Citroen, Vodafone PLC, and France Telekom are increasing their FDI to
Turkey, arguing that the investor protection and overall investment climate improved considerably
as a result of these reforms. As a result, FDI °ows has boomed from an average of well under $1
billion in the 1990s to $2.6 billion in last year and more than a $5 billion projected for 2005.
The \Lucas Paradox" is related to the major \puzzles" in international macroeconomics and
¯nance.7 These include the high correlation between savings and investment in OECD countries
(the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle); the lack of overseas investment by the home country residents
(the home bias puzzle); and the low correlations of consumption growth across countries (the
risk sharing puzzle). All of these puzzles stem from the lack of international capital °ows, more
speci¯cally, the lack of international equity holdings. However, the empirical literature on these
issues is extremely thin and not in agreement. In particular, we still do not know what is more
important in explaining the \Lucas Paradox": fundamentals or market failures? Some researchers
provide indirect historical evidence that schooling, natural resources, and demographic factors
are the reasons for the European investment into the \new world."8 The empirical literature on
the determinants of capital °ows has focused on the role of external (push) and internal (pull)
factors. Researchers ¯nd that external factors, mostly low interest rates in the developed nations,
in particular in the U.S., played an important role in accounting for the renewal of foreign lending
to developing countries in the 1990s.9 The literature pays particular attention to the determinants
of FDI and shows that government size, political stability, and openness play an important role.10
In terms of the determinants of bilateral equity °ows and external debt some studies ¯nd support
for theories emphasizing imperfections in international credit markets.11 These papers, however,
have not paid particular attention to the role of institutions in shaping international capital °ows
over the long-run.12
7See Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) for an overview of the major puzzles in international economies.
8In the context of British overseas investment before World War I, O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) ¯nd that
British capital chased European emigrants, where both were seeking cheap land and natural resources. Clemens and
Williamson (2004), using data on British investment in 34 countries during 19th century, show that two thirds of the
British capital exports went to the labor-scarce new world and only about one quarter of it went to labor abundant
Asia and Africa because of similar reasons.
9See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996).
10See Edwards (1991) and Wei and Wu (2002).
11See Lane (2004) and Portes and Rey (2005).
12Using ¯rm-level data Stulz (2005) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) show that the institutions of the country
in which a ¯rm is located a®ect how investors receive a return from investing in the ¯rm. Speci¯cally, they show that
almost all of the variation in governance ratings across ¯rms in less developed countries is attributable to country
characteristics. The implication of their work is that weak institutions at the country-level can explain the lack of
3Our paper is also related to the recent work on economic development that emphasizes the role
of institutions for achieving higher levels of income.13 However there is little systematic evidence on
the speci¯c mechanisms. Our results show institutional quality shaped international capital °ows
in the last thirty years, which in turn implies that foreign investment can be one of the missing
links through which institutions a®ect long-run development.14
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the standard neoclassical model
and presents the main empirical implications in terms of capital movements. Section 3 investigates
the role of the di®erent theoretical explanations of the \Lucas Paradox" in a cross-country regression
framework. Section 4 concludes.
2 Conceptual Issues
Assume a small open economy where output is produced using capital K and labor L via a Cobb-
Douglas production function,
Yt = AtF(Kt;Lt) = AtK®
t L1¡®
t FK(:) > 0;FL(:) > 0; FKK(:) < 0;FLL(:) < 0; (1)
where Y denotes output and A denotes the total factor productivity (TFP). Agents can borrow and
lend capital internationally. If all countries share a common technology, perfect capital mobility
implies the instantaneous convergence of the returns to capital. Hence, for countries i and j,
Atf0(kit) = rt = Atf0(kjt); (2)
where f(:) is the net of depreciation production function in per capita terms and k denotes capital
per capita. Diminishing returns to capital implies that in the transition process, resources will °ow
from capital abundant countries (low returns) to capital scarce countries (high returns). Although
widely used in the growth literature, the neoclassical model with constant TFP has counterfactual
implications for rates of return since not enough capital seems to °ow to capital scarce countries and
implied interest rates do not seem to converge. As explained in the introduction, the theoretical
explanations for this paradoxical pattern can be grouped as di®erences in fundamentals across
°ows to countries where the physical marginal product of capital is the highest, a corollary on which we provide
systematic evidence.
13See North (1981, 1994, 1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002).
14Klein (2005) shows that the e®ect of capital account liberalization on growth depends on the institutional devel-
opment of a country.
4countries versus international capital market imperfections. We investigate each group in detail
below.
2.1 Fundamentals
Missing Factors of Production
One of the explanations for the lack of capital °ows from rich to poor countries is the existence
of other factors|such as human capital and land|that positively a®ect the returns to capital but
are generally ignored by the conventional neoclassical approach. For example, if human capital
positively a®ects capital's return, less capital tends to °ow to countries with lower endowments of
human capital. Thus, if the production function is in fact given by






where Zt denotes another factor that a®ects the production process, then (2) misrepresents the
implied capital °ows. Hence, for countries i and j the true return is
Atf0(kit;zit) = rt = Atf0(kjt;zjt): (4)
Government Policies
Government policies can be another impediment to the °ows and the convergence of the re-
turns. For example, di®erences across countries in government tax policies can lead to substantial
di®erences in capital-labor ratios. In°ation may work as a tax and decrease the return to capital.
In addition, the government can explicitly limit capital °ows by imposing capital controls. We can
model the e®ect of these distortive government policies by assuming that governments tax capital's
return at a rate ¿, which di®ers across countries. Hence, for countries i and j, the true return is
Atf0(kit)(1 ¡ ¿it) = rt = Atf0(kjt)(1 ¡ ¿jt): (5)
Institutional Structure and Total Factor Productivity
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society. They consist of both informal constraints
(traditions, customs) and formal rules (rules, laws, constitutions). They shape the structure of
5an economy. North (1994) de¯nes institutions as the humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic, and social interaction. There is an important distinction between policies and
institutions. Policies are choices made within a political and social structure, i.e., within a set of
institutions.
Institutions are understood to a®ect economic performance through their e®ect on investment
decisions by protecting the property rights of entrepreneurs against the government and other seg-
ments of the society and preventing elites from blocking the adoption of new technologies. In
general, weak property rights due to poor institutions can lead to lack of productive capacities
or uncertainty of returns in an economy. Thus institutional weaknesses create a wedge between
expected returns and ex-post returns. We model these as di®erences in the parameter At, which
captures di®erences in overall e±ciency in the production across countries. In de¯ning the parame-
ter At, we cannot di®erentiate between the e®ect of institutions on investment opportunities versus
that of the TFP (i.e., At de¯ned as the incentive structure that allows for innovations versus At de-
¯ned as the productivity index). Indeed, as Prescott (1998) argues, the e±cient use of the existing
technology or the resistance to the adoption of new ones depends on the \arrangements" a society
employs. Eichengreen (2003) argues that capital-labor ratios across countries might di®er because
of di®erences in cultural context and/or technological capacity. Although technology is available
to all countries, there might be barriers to adoption of the existing technologies, or di®erences in
the e±cient use of the same technology.15;16
Hence, for countries i and j, the true return is given by,
Aitf0(kit) = rt = Ajtf0(kjt): (6)
2.2 International Capital Market Imperfections
Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information problems, intrinsic to capital markets, can be ex-ante (adverse selec-
tion), interim (moral hazard) or ex-post (costly state veri¯cation). In general, under asymmetric
information, the main implications of the neoclassical model regarding the capital °ows tend not
to hold. In a model with moral hazard, for example, where lenders cannot monitor borrowers'
15See Parente and Prescott (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2003).
16Kalemli-Ozcan, Reshef, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003) show that capital °ows to high productivity states within the
U.S., where there is a common institutional structure. This result is consistent with the prediction of a neoclassical
model with TFP di®erences.
6investment, poor countries' per capita investment depends positively on per capita wealth. Alter-
natively, if foreign investors are handicapped in terms of domestic market information, they tend
to under-invest.
Sovereign Risk
Sovereign risk is de¯ned as any situation where a sovereign defaults on loan contracts with
foreigners, seizes foreign assets located within its borders, or prevents domestic residents from
fully meeting obligations to foreign contracts.17 The problem stems from the fact that repayment
incentives for debtors might di®er from what is in a contract between two nations because the
ability of a court to force a sovereign entity to comply is extremely limited.
Lucas, citing the speci¯c example of India, dismisses sovereign risk as an explanation for the
lack of °ows from rich to poor countries. He maintains that investors in India faced the same
rules and regulations as the investors in the U.K. However, as Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) argue,
the numerous rebellions in India while a British colony indicate that the perceived ex-ante risk
of expropriation was greater than the ex-post one. Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) emphasize the
relationship between sovereign risk and historical defaults and conclude that sovereign risk must
be the explanation for the \Lucas Paradox." They argue the following: \[T]he fact that so many
poor countries are in default on their debts, that so little funds are channeled through equity, and
that overall private lending rises more than proportionately with wealth, all strongly support the
view that political risk is the main reason why we do not see more capital °ows to developing
countries. If credit market imperfections abate over time due to better institutions, human capital
externalities or other \new growth theory" elements may come to play a larger role." This argument
is fully consistent with our result since historical defaults are indicators of poor quality of the early
institutions.18
17Lucas discusses monopoly power and capital controls, i.e., distortive government policies under capital market
imperfections since he combines domestic and international capital market imperfections. Following Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995), we considered international capital market imperfections only those related to sovereign enforcement
problems or those based on information asymmetries. We put all domestic distortions under fundamentals since they
a®ect capital's productivity.
18In fact, we are sympathetic to the view that institutions may account for both weak fundamentals and capital
market imperfections since historically weak institutions might be responsible for historical and current sovereign risk
and high probability of default.
73 Institutions and the \Lucas Paradox:" OLS Estimates
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Capital Flows
The International Financial Statistics (IFS) issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
is the standard data source for annual capital in°ows. Although there are other data sources, the
IMF, IFS provides the most comprehensive and comparable data on international capital °ows.19
The main categories of capital in°ows are foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity invest-
ment, and debt in°ows. FDI data include green¯eld investments (construction of new factories),
equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and ¯nancial derivatives associated with vari-
ous intercompany transactions between a±liated enterprises. Portfolio equity investment include
shares, stock participations, and similar documents that usually denote ownership of equity. When
a foreign investor purchases a local ¯rm's securities without a controlling stake, the investment is
regarded as a portfolio investment. FDI is equity participation giving a controlling stake.20 In
the regression analysis, we do not distinguish between minority and majority shareholders, as this
distinction is not important to our analysis. In addition, because of missing portfolio data (some
countries tend not to receive portfolio °ows, in part due to lack of functioning stock markets), we
prefer to use total foreign equity °ows in the analysis, which is the sum of in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment.
Debt in°ows include bonds, debentures, notes, and money market or negotiable debt instru-
ments. We prefer to abstract most of our analysis from debt °ows since they tend to be shaped
by government decisions to a greater extent than °ows of equity.21 We, on the other hand, would
like to capture market decisions.22 Ideally, we would like to use all of the private capital °ows and
abstract the public part of debt °ows. These data, however, is not available. The IMF, IFS data
include both private and public issuers and holders of debt securities. Although the data are further
19All the data that are discussed in this section are described in greater detail in appendix A.
20The IMF classi¯es an investment as direct if a foreign investor holds at least 10 percent of a local ¯rm's equity
while the remaining equity purchases are classi¯ed under portfolio equity investment. Recently most of the FDI has
been in the form of mergers & acquisitions instead of green¯eld investments.
21Until the mid 1970s|following the shutting down of the international markets in the 1930s|debt °ows to
most developing countries were generally restricted to international organizations/government-to-government loans.
During the late 1970s, banks replaced governments of industrial countries as lenders to developing countries. After
1982, following the debt crisis, o±cial creditors once again dominated lending to developing countries.
22In many countries bank loans have usually been intermediated through poorly regulated ¯nancial systems, hence
not responding to market incentives. See Henry and Lorentzen (2003) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
8divided by monetary authorities, general government, banks and other sectors, this information is
unfortunately not available for most countries for long periods of time. In addition, it is di±cult to
divide the available data by private/public creditor and debtor.23 On the other hand, one might
fear that excluding debt in°ows totally will reduce measures of capital in°ows for countries with
limited stock market development and/or for countries that receive low levels of FDI, which in turn
might bias our results. We argue that the role of total equity (direct and portfolio) °ows for the
developing countries is not small at all. For the developing countries, average in°ows of FDI per
capita grew by 6.2% over the last thirty years and became the main source of private capital during
the 1990s. Average in°ows of portfolio equity per capita grew by 9.3%. Average in°ows of debt
per capita grew only by 3.3%. We, nevertheless, examine the role of debt in°ows in our robustness
section.
Another issue about the IMF, IFS capital °ows data is related to the importance of valuation
e®ects. As Obstfeld (2004) notes, \an increasingly serious inadequacy of the standard current
account measure is that it does not incorporate potentially large valuation e®ects." The IFS
reports BOP transactions as °ows of equity and debt. The recent literature draws attention to the
signi¯cant role of capital gains and losses, defaults, price and exchange rate °uctuations, i.e., on
valuation e®ects, as an international ¯nancial adjustment mechanism.24 Kraay, Loayza, Serven, and
Ventura (2000, 2005) (KLSV) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999, 2001) (LM) construct estimates
of foreign assets and liabilities and their subcomponents for di®erent countries in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s, paying particular attention to these valuation e®ects, thus providing a better \tracking
device" of a country's external position. These authors perform a meticulous job of cleaning the
existing data. LM estimate stocks of portfolio equity and foreign direct investment based on the
IMF, IFS °ow data. In order to estimate FDI stocks, the authors cumulate °ows and adjust for
the e®ects of exchange rate changes. For portfolio equity stocks, they adjust for changes in the end
of year U.S. dollar value of the domestic stock market. KLSV argue against the valuation of stocks
using stock market prices maintaining that capital listed on the stock market and the corresponding
23The World Bank's Global Development Finance database, which focuses on the liability side, divides debt data by
the type of creditor (o±cial and private) but not by the type of debtor. These data are available only for developing
countries. As Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) note, for developing countries there are discrepancies between the
loan °ows reported in the IMF BOP Statistics and the changes in the external debt stocks as reported by the
World Bank's Global Development Finance Database. Following the debt 1980s debt crisis, there are a number of
measurement problems related to di®erent methodologies for recording non-payments, rescheduling, debt forgiveness,
and reductions.
24Obstfeld (2004) compares two cases. In one case, ¯rms with equity held by foreigners pay dividends. In the
second case, ¯rms with equity held by foreigners retain earnings. In the ¯rst case, paying dividends would show up
in the current account as a service import (net factor income). In the second case, a ¯rm's stock market price would
rise but there would be no record in the balance of payments under the current accounting method.
9share prices|especially in developing countries|are not representative of the stock of capital of a
country. Instead, they use the price of investment goods in local currency, which is the investment
de°ator. They also adjust for exchange rate changes as in the LM data set. Both KLSV and LM
data-sets are higher quality since the respective authors put extreme care on cleaning the basic IFS
data, checking individual country sources and so forth.
We use capital in°ows data from these three di®erent sources in our empirical analysis. We
calculate annual in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment out of the stocks in the KLSV and
LM data sets as the yearly change in the stock of foreign claims on domestic capital. The in°ows
of direct investment from the IMF (which KLSV and LM data are based on), include reinvested
earnings of foreign-owned ¯rms, while data on in°ows of portfolio equity investment do not. As
KLSV point out, changes in the stock market valuation of equities will re°ect these reinvested
earnings while changes in the investment de°ator valuation will not. Hence, KLSV procedure will
underestimate the claims on portfolio equity investment. We believe the weakness of the stock
market data for developing countries to be of greater concern and hence use KLSV data in most
of our analysis.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on 81 countries during 1970¡2000 from the IMF data; 58
countries between 1970¡1997 from the KLSV data; and 56 countries between 1970¡1998 from the
LM data. These countries constitute our \base" samples for each data set. The \base" sample
countries are selected out of available data for our variables of interest, which are 98, 61, and 60
countries in each data set respectively, since the \base" sample countries are the ones where data
are available for all the main explanatory variables. In all our regressions the dependent variable is
the in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita, averaged over the relevant sample
period. We believe per capita measures are more in line with the theoretical literature.25 We
use the average in°ows to capture the long-run e®ects of the various explanations of the \Lucas
Paradox."
Average in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita has a mean of 117.34 with
a standard deviation of 170.29 for the IMF sample; 38.57 with a standard deviation of 59.27 for
the KLSV sample; and 202.29 with a standard deviation of 322 for the LM sample. Notice that
the IMF and LM data are in 1996 constant U.S. dollars and KLSV data are in 1990 constant U.S.
dollars. All three data sets show large amount of variation, where some countries receive 1000 times
more °ows than the others. Explanatory variables also show similarly large variation, which we
25In addition a histogram revealed that this measure is more normally distributed than the other potential measures.
10explain in detail below.
\Lucas Paradox" and the Fundamentals
Figure 1 shows in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment for 23 developed and 75 de-
veloping countries during 1970{2000. The di®erence between the two is a stark demonstration of
north-north °ows, or the \Lucas Paradox." We use the logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP) in
1970 on the right hand side in each regression to capture the \Lucas Paradox", in other words, the
positive signi¯cance of this variable demonstrates the presence of the \Paradox." Then we include
the other explanatory variables. We analyze which one makes the logarithm of GDP per capita in
1970 insigni¯cant when included, hence providing an explanation for the \Lucas Paradox."26
To capture fundamentals we use the logarithm of the average years of total schooling and average
institutional quality, where both of these variables are averaged over the relevant sample period.
The measurement of institutional quality is a challenging task. As argued by Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001), there is a \cluster of institutions," including constraints on government
expropriation, independent judiciary, property rights enforcement, and institutions providing equal
rights and ensuring civil liberties, that are important to encourage investment and growth. Thus we
construct a yearly composite index using International Country Risk Guide's (ICRG) variables from
the PRS Group.27 The composite index is the sum of the indices of investment pro¯le, government
stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption, non-militarized politics, protection from
religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and
bureaucratic quality. This index takes values from 0 to 10 for each country, where a higher score
means lower risk.28
26Note that upon the inclusion of the other explanatory variables, the insigni¯cance of the log GDP per capita
in 1970 is the su±cient condition for the \Paradox" to disappear. Everything else equal, the neoclassical theory
implies a negative relationship between the initial capital stock (or the initial output) and the future in°ows only if
the countries are at the same technological development level. Unfortunately data does not allow us to control for
the cross-country di®erences in technology other than the addition of the Solow residual as an extra control. See
appendix D for a related exercise.
27The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data are not based on opinion surveys of any kind. The ICRG
model for forecasting ¯nancial, economic, and political risk was created in 1980 by the editors of \International
Reports", a weekly newsletter on international ¯nance and economics. The editors created a statistical model to
calculate country risks, which later turned into a comprehensive system that enables measuring and comparing
various types of country level economic and political risks. In 1992, ICRG (its editor and analysts) moved from
\International Reports" to \The PRS Group". Now, \The PRS Group's" professional sta® assigns scores for each
category to each country.
28The previous ICRG classi¯cation (1982¡1995) included risk of government repudiation of contracts and risk of
expropriation, both of which are used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). After 1995 these variables are
reported under ICRG's investment pro¯le category.
11Theoretical papers show that low levels of human capital and weak institutions dampen the
productivity of capital. Thus, we expect these variables to be positively signi¯cant. As shown in
table 1, GDP per capita (PPP) in 1970, average institutional quality and average years of schooling
show large variation. GDP per capita in 1970 varies between 500 PPP U.S. dollars to 23,000 PPP
U.S. dollars; and the most educated country has 11 years of schooling as opposed to 0 in the least
educated country. For the institutional quality variable we have countries with strong institutions
in the 75 percentile of the distribution such as U.K. and Denmark and also countries with weak
institutions in the 25 percentile of the distribution such as Turkey and Mexico. Because our
samples are composed of poor and rich countries, there is large variation in all of these explanatory
variables, which in turn allows us to test for various explanations behind the \Lucas Paradox" in
a cross-country setting.
We also use an additional variable, restrictions to capital mobility, as a measure of a govern-
ment's explicit restriction to free capital mobility. This measure is the average of four dummy
variables constructed by the IMF: exchange arrangements, payments restrictions on current trans-
actions and on capital transactions, and repatriation requirements for export proceeds, where each
dummy takes a value of 1 if there is the restriction. These restrictions vary between 0 and 1, as
shown in table 1 and we expect this variable to be negatively signi¯cant. Since many countries
liberalized their capital accounts throughout our sample period, we also run our cross-country re-
gressions for each decade in our sample, as shown in appendix D. This exercise will capture the
changing nature of the restrictions to capital mobility variable.
International Capital Market Imperfections
It is di±cult to obtain the appropriate information (from an investment point of view) about a
country without visiting the country and therefore how far away that country is located could be
a concern. Portfolio managers and investment bankers, who advise their clients about investing in
China, for example, advertise themselves by pointing out how frequently they visit the country. As
Adam Smith noted, \In the home trade, his capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is
in the foreign trade of consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the persons
whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the country
from which he must seek redress."29 Recently distance has been used a proxy for the international
capital market failures, mainly asymmetric information. Analyzing the equity holdings of a large
29Adam Smith (1976, p. 454) quoted in Gordon and Bovenberg (1996).
12sample of actively managed mutual funds in the U.S., Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) ¯nd that
fund managers earn substantially abnormal returns in geographically proximate investments (within
a 100 kilometers of a fund's headquarters). The authors interpret the results as fund managers
exploiting informational advantages in their selection of nearby stocks. Portes and Rey (2005) use
a similar interpretation of distance in the context of bilateral capital °ows as do Wei and Wu (2002)
in analyzing the determinants of bilateral FDI and bank lending.
We construct a similar variable called \distantness," which is the weighted average of the dis-
tances from the capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of the other countries, using
the GDP shares of the other countries as weights. We construct this variable following Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003). We use Arcview software to obtain latitude and longitude of
each capital city and calculate the great arc distance between each pair. The GDP weights capture
the positive relation between trade volume and GDP. This variable is di®erent than \distance from
equator" and average distance so it is not a proxy for geography. It is a proxy for \remoteness, "
and hence captures information frictions. For example, a country like Congo, which is closer to the
equator, is going to be farther from other countries if we just look at average distance. It is going
to be even farther according to our measure because of the GDP weights. Based on our measure,
a country like U.S. will be one of the least remote countries.30 Table 1 shows that the most dis-
advantaged country in terms of this variable is 3 times more distant then the least disadvantaged
country. We expect the distantness variable to be negatively signi¯cant. Table 2 shows descriptive
statistics for the additional control variables that are used in the robustness analysis.
3.2 Correlations
In table 3, we display the matrix of correlations between the regressors. In general, most of the
correlations are all below 0.50, with the clear exception of GDP, institutions and schooling. Log
GDP per capita and institutional quality are highly correlated in all three samples and so are log
GDP per capita and log schooling. Since the main point of our analysis is to ¯nd out which of the
explanatory variables remove the \Lucas Paradox," it is very important to look at the role of each
variable one at a time and also in a multiple regression framework given the high correlations. We
also undertake Monte Carlo simulations and other tests to show that our results are not spurious









t is the year t sample-wide (total) GDP, and T is the sample length. For
Congo: average distance (without the weights) is 6600 kms (it ranks 35th in a sample of 60, where 1 is the farthest)
and distantness is 9000 kms (it ranks 16th in a sample of 60, where 1 is the most distant). For U.S: average distance
(without the weights) is 8700 kms (it ranks 28th in a sample of 60, where 1 is the farthest) and distantness is 6400
kms (it ranks 45th in a sample of 60, where 1 is the most distant).
13due to highly correlated variables. Table 4 shows the correlations between the main explanatory
variables and the additional control variables that are used in the robustness analysis.
3.3 OLS Regressions
Speci¯cation and the Results
We perform cross-country OLS regressions. The main reason for this is that most of our
explanatory variables are slowly changing over time. Figure 2 plots the evolution of each component
of our composite institutional quality index, averaged for all 58 countries in our \base" sample for
the KLSV data. It is clear that there is almost no time variation in the institutional quality
index during our sample period. Figure 3 plots the evolution of each component only for the poor
countries in the same sample, which are the developing and emerging market countries. We can
easily see that the improvements in the indices of external con°ict, internal con°ict, government
stability, and to some extent investment pro¯le are all due to the improvements in the developing
countries.31
Table 5 reports OLS regressions of average in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment
per capita on log of GDP per capita in 1970 and average institutional quality, using the IMF, IFS
capita °ows data. The linear regressions are for the equation,
Fi = ¹ + ®logYi + ¯Ii + "i; (7)
where F is average in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita (in°ows of capital
per capita), ¹ is a constant, Yi is log of GDP per capita in 1970, Ii is average institutional quality
and "i is a random error term. The coe±cients of interest are both ® and ¯, the e®ect of log GDP
per capita and institutional quality on in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita
respectively.
We have 98 countries, denoted as the \whole world" sample, and 81 countries as the \base"
sample. The \whole world" samples have similar descriptive statistics.32 Our additional explana-
31The improvement in the government stability and internal con°ict components for developing countries during
the 1990s captures the political changes in Latin America and Asia, in particular in Guatemala and El Salvador,
where the civil wars were ended, and in India, where government stability improved after the violence in the 1980s.
32For the 98 country whole world sample out of the IMF data: mean and the standard deviation for the in°ows are
103.9, and 158.4; mean and the standard deviation for the GDP per capita are 5.9, and 4.5; mean and the standard
deviation for institutions are 6.8, and 1.4. For the 61 country \whole world" sample out of KLSV data: mean and
the standard deviation for the in°ows are 38.0, and 58.37; mean and the standard deviation for the GDP per capita
are 5.12, and 4.02; mean and the standard deviation for institutions are 6.9, and 1.6. For the 60 country \whole
14tory variables are only available for the \base" sample. Both of these samples are composed of
poor and rich, and small open and large open economies.33 Notice that since both capital in°ows
and log GDP are in per capita terms, we are already controlling for the size e®ects. Our main
result is that institutional quality is the variable that explains the \Lucas Paradox." Column (1)
demonstrates that capital °ows to rich countries, the \Lucas Paradox." In column (2) we add our
index of institutional quality. Upon this addition, we see that the \Lucas Paradox" disappears.
The institutional quality is the \preferred" variable by the data. This result may not be surprising
from an econometric standpoint since the recent research on institutions and development shows
that these two variables are highly collinear because the historically determined component of in-
stitutions is a very good predictor for income in 1970.34 Nevertheless, our index of institutions is
signi¯cant at 1% level, while the log GDP per capita is not. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same
exercise for the \base" sample. The impact of institutions on capital in°ows in our \base" sample
is quite similar to that of the \whole world" sample.
As shown in column (5), on its own the index of institutions can explain 52% of the cross-
country variation in in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita. It is very striking
that log GDP per capita has no additional explanatory power, which can be seen by comparing
columns (4) and (5). The partial R2 is 0.0 for the log GDP per capita, whereas it is 0.13 for the
index of institutions as seen by comparing columns (3) and (4).
To get a sense of the magnitude of the e®ect of institutional quality on in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment per capita, let's consider two countries such as Guyana and Italy: if
we move up from the 25 percentile (Guyana) to the 75 percentile (Italy) in the distribution of the
index of institutions, based on the results shown in column (4), we have 187.54 dollars more in°ows
per capita over the sample period on average. This represents a 60% increase in in°ows per capita
over the sample mean, which is 117.34 dollars, therefore it has quite an e®ect.
Table 6 investigates the role of the other proposed explanations for the \Lucas Paradox," both
for the whole world and for the \base" samples. Notice that \whole world" sample changes for
each variable due to data availability. In column (1), we add average log years of schooling, which
turns out to be insigni¯cant.35 In column (2), we add log distantness, which also turns out to
world" sample out of LM data: mean and the standard deviation for the in°ows are 193.0, and 313.3; mean and the
standard deviation for the GDP per capita are 6.7, and 5.3; mean and the standard deviation for institutions are 7.1,
and 1.5.
33See appendix B for the detailed list of countries.
34A similar result can be ¯nd in Acemoglu et al. (2003), where they investigate the e®ect of institutional quality
and GDP per capita on growth volatility.
35We repeat the analysis using average years of higher schooling instead of total schooling as the measure human
capital and get similar results.
15be insigni¯cant. Column (3) looks at the role of restrictions to capital mobility, which enters
negative and signi¯cant at 1% level. However, log GDP per capita also remains positive and
signi¯cant and hence restrictions to capital mobility cannot account for the \Paradox." Columns
(4)-(6) repeat the same exercise for the \base" sample, obtaining similar results. Column (7) runs
the multiple regression, where the \Paradox" disappears because of the inclusion of the index of
institutions. Only in the regressions where the index of institutions is included on its own (as
shown in table 5) or together with the other explanatory variables, log GDP per capita becomes
insigni¯cant. Restrictions to capital mobility is also an important determinant but it cannot account
for the \Paradox." The institutional quality variable is robust to inclusion of the other explanatory
variables and is always signi¯cant at the 1% level. One might argue that PPP based GDP is higher
in the poor countries that receive low levels of in°ows, an issue which will cause a downward bias
on log GDP per capita. Column (8) runs the same regression using log GDP per capita (constant
1996 dollars) in 1970 instead of the PPP based measure used in the previous columns and shows
that this is not the case. The estimated coe±cient on log GDP per capita is little higher but still
insigni¯cant and the estimated coe±cient on institutional quality is very similar.36 The results are
also economically signi¯cant as before. Based on the results shown in column (7), if we move up
from the 25 percentile (Philippines) to the 75 percentile (Spain) in the distribution of the index
of institutions we have 163.32 dollars more in°ows per capita over the sample period on average.
This represents a 40% increase in in°ows per capita over the sample mean, which is 117.34 dollars.
Table 7 repeats the same exercise using KLSV capital in°ows data. As mentioned, these data
are better measures of capital °ows. Column (1) demonstrates the \Lucas Paradox" for the \whole
world" sample. Column (2) shows our main result that the \Lucas Paradox" disappears with the
addition of institutional quality. Columns (3) and (4) demonstrate the same result for the \base"
sample for which all of the main explanatory variables are available. As before, the estimated
coe±cients are very similar in both samples. Column (4) also shows a partial R2 of 0.16 for the index
of institutional quality. Columns (5)-(7) add the other proposed explanations for the \Paradox."
Both log years of schooling and restrictions to capital mobility are signi¯cant at 1% level with
the right sign. However log GDP per capita remains to be signi¯cant in these speci¯cations, i.e.,
these other potential explanations cannot account for the \Paradox." As before, in the multiple
regression of column (8) institutional quality is the main explanation for the capital in°ows in the
last thirty years and log GDP per capita becomes insigni¯cant. Column (9) repeats column (8)
using log GDP per capita (constant 1996 dollars) instead of the PPP log GDP per capita, obtaining
36We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
16a similar result.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the e®ect of institutional quality on in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment, we will perform the following exercise: based on the results shown
in column (4), if we move up from the 25 percentile (Syria) to the 75 percentile (U.K.) in the
distribution of the index of institutions we have 77.30 dollars more in°ows per capita over the
sample period on average. This represents a 100% increase in in°ows per capita over the sample
mean, which is 38.57 dollars. Results shown in column (8) imply a 70% increase over the sample
mean (an increase of 65.67 dollars). These results imply a signi¯cantly large e®ect of institutional
quality on foreign investment.
Table 8 reports the result of the same speci¯cations using the LM data, obtaining similar results.
Are the Results Driven by Multicollinearity?
One might worry that the results are spurious due to the high correlation between GDP per
capita and institutions. Given the multiple regression framework we are capturing the direct e®ect
of institutional quality on capital in°ows. GDP per capita also depends on institutional quality,
creating an indirect e®ect. Given the high correlation between them we may not be able to identify
the individual e®ects. We undertake a number of tests to show that indeed we are capturing the
independent e®ect of institutions and multicollinearity is not driving our results.
Panel A of the ¯gure 4 plots the residuals from the regression of average in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment per capita on average institutional quality against the residuals from
the regression of log GDP per capita in 1970 on average institutional quality. The Frisch-Waugh
theorem says the coe±cient from this regression is exactly the same as the one for GDP per capita
in the multiple regression. Thus the slope of the ¯tted line is 0.14 as shown in column (4) of table
5. Similarly, Panel B of the same ¯gure plots the residuals from the regression of average in°ows of
direct and portfolio equity investment per capita on log GDP per capita in 1970 against the residuals
from the regression of institutions on log GDP per capita in 1970. By the Frish-Waugh theorem
the slope of the ¯tted line is 0.75 as shown in column (4) of table 5.37 It is clear from the ¯gures
that the exogenous component of log GDP per capita cannot explain the cross-country variation in
capital in°ows per capita but the exogenous component of the index of institutions can. What is
also clear from the ¯gures is that the strong positive relation between the institutional quality index
37The Frisch-Waugh theorem can be shown as follows: To establish the conditional correlation for the variable
of interest, that is institutional quality, and given the main regression, Fi = ¹ + ®logYi + ¯Ii + "i; we run Ii =
¸0 + ¸1 logYi + ²i and Fi = °0 + °1 logYi + ºi, then we run ºi = ³ + µ²i + !. By Frish-Waugh theorem µ = ¯:
17and the capital in°ows per capita is evidently not due to the speci¯c outliers. Recently \opened up"
economies like East Asian countries, for example, might be a group of outliers driving the results.
It is clear from the ¯gure that our results are not driven by capital account liberalization episodes
but rather by countries, which, ceteris paribus, have very high levels of institutional quality, such
as Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, and U.K. Figure 5 repeats the same exercise for our
\preferred" KLSV data \base" sample. The slopes of the ¯tted lines in panels A and B correspond
to the coe±cients in column (4) of table 7.
Another way to think about the above exercise is the following. It is clear that GDP per
capita and the index of institutions have a common component and each can be written as a linear
function of the other and an error term. We argue that the \variable-speci¯c" component of the
index of institutions|de¯ned as the residual from the regression of average institutional quality
on log GDP per capita in 1970|has the explanatory power and the \variable-speci¯c" component
of GDP{de¯ned as the residual from the regression of log GDP per capita in 1970 on average
institutional quality{does not have any explanatory power.38
Appendix C reports results on three di®erent simulation exercises, which are di®erent regression
diagnostic tests and are performed using the KLSV \base" sample of 58 countries. These are
Monte Carlo simulations, perturbation exercise based on Beaton, Rubin, and Barone (1976), and
calculating a condition index as in Belsley (1991). All of these show that our results are not spurious
due to highly correlated variables.39 In addition none of our robustness regressions show any big
sign and magnitude changes, which are typical indicators of multicollinearity.
4 Institutions and the \Lucas Paradox:" IV Estimates
It is possible that the capital in°ows a®ect the institutional quality of a country. More in°ows
can generate incentives to reform and create an investor friendly environment.40 Moreover most
institutional quality measures are constructed ex-post, and the analysts may have had a natural
bias in \assigning" better institutions to countries with higher capital in°ows. Another source
38Upon running a regression of average capital in°ows per capita on average institutional quality and the \variable-
speci¯c component" of log GDP per capita in 1970, which is the residual from the regression of log GDP per capita
in 1970 on average institutional quality we con¯rm that this independent component of log GDP per capita in 1970
has no e®ect. When we run a regression of average capital in°ows per capita on log GDP per capita in 1970 and
the \variable-speci¯c" component of average institutional quality instead, which is the residual from the regression
of average institutional quality on log GDP per capita in 1970, we ¯nd that the independent component of the index
of institutions clearly has the explanatory power and this is exactly what drives our results. By the Frish-Waugh
theorem, the coe±cients on the \variable speci¯c" components are the same as in the multiple regression.
39We thank to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to do these exercises, which strengthened our paper.
40See Rajan and Zingales (2003).
18of endogeneity can come from the possibility that both in°ows and institutional quality might
be determined by an omitted third factor. We believe the extensive robustness analysis that is
undertaken in appendix D shows that this is not the case.
As a ¯rst cut, table 9 regresses average capital in°ows over 1985¡1997 on institutional quality
in 1984 and log GDP per capita in 1984. There is a positive and signi¯cant e®ect of pre-sample
institutions on the subsequent 13 years of capital in°ows per capita. The coe±cient that is reported
in column (2) is higher than the one reported in column (4) of table 7 as expected. Institutional
quality can account for the 59% of the variation. Log GDP per capita does not have any additional
explanatory power, where the partial R2 is 0.0.
Our second approach is to run IV regressions using instruments that are not subject to reverse
causality and can account for the institutional variation. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997, 1998) emphasize the importance of the legal origins on the current institutions.
They examine the laws governing investor protection, the enforcement of these laws, and the extent
of concentration of ¯rm ownership across countries. They ¯nd that countries with di®erent legal
histories o®er di®erent types of legal protection to their investors. Most countries' legal rules,
either through colonialism, conquest, or outright borrowing, can be traced to one of four distinct
European legal systems: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian
civil law. They show that countries whose legal rules originate in the common law tradition o®er
the greatest protection to investors. As far as law enforcement is concerned, German civil law
and Scandinavian civil law countries emerge superior. The French civil law countries o®er both
the weakest legal protection and the worst enforcement. These legal origin variables have been
increasingly adopted as exogenous determinants of institutional quality in the economic growth
literature.
In contrast, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) emphasize the conditions in the
colonies. They argue that it is not the identity of the colonizer or the legal origin what matters,
but whether the European colonialists could safely settle in a particular location. If the European
settlement was discouraged by diseases or where the surplus extraction was bene¯cial via an ur-
banized and prosperous population, the Europeans set up worse institutions. Thus, they argue
that historical mortality rates of European settlers are valid instruments for current institutions of
former colonies. They also claim that the legal origin is a weak instrument for institutional quality,
in particular for institutions that protect property rights. They claim it is hard to make a case that
legal origins do not have any direct e®ect on the relevant outcome variables such as income levels.
They stress that successful instruments have to be theoretically excludable from the empirical model
19used by the econometrician and undertaking overidenti¯cation tests are not enough. As a result we
use log European settler mortality rates as an instrument for institutions, which is an excludable
instrument as shown below.
Table 10 presents the results of the two stage least squares regressions in panel A, the associated
¯rst stage regressions in panel B, and the OLS counterpart in panel C. We only have 34 countries
since only 34 out of our 58 country \base" sample are the former colonies where we have the
log settler mortality data available. As shown in column (1) average institutional quality has a
causal e®ect on average in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita, where average
institutional quality is instrumented by log European settler mortality. The ¯rst stage regression
shows the signi¯cant e®ect of log settler mortality on institutional quality with an R2 of 0.39.41
The estimated coe±cient is higher than the OLS counterpart that is shown in panel C and also
higher than the one reported in table 9, since IV regression corrects both for endogeneity and the
attenuation bias caused by the measurement error in the index of institutions. In fact, the results
suggest that measurement error in the index of institutions is a more serious concern then reverse
causality. Column (2) adds log GDP per capita in 1970 as an additional control. The qualitative
results are the same. Of course the estimated coe±cients are much higher here given the collinearity
between log European settler mortality and log GDP per capita.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the e®ect of institutional quality on in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment, we will perform the following exercise: Based on the results shown in
column (1), if we move up from the 25 percentile (Peru) to the 75 percentile (Australia) in the
distribution of the index of institutions we have 78.58 dollars more in°ows per capita over the sample
period on average. This represents an almost 5 times increase in in°ows per capita over the sample
mean, which is 15.76 dollars. Given the causal e®ect these results imply an impressively large e®ect
of institutional quality on foreign investment. Notice that the quantitative e®ect obtained from the
IV regression is much larger than the one obtained from the OLS regression due to the attenuation
bias in the OLS regression.
Table 11 reports the results of the tests for validity and excludability of the instrument, following
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). Instrumenting average institutional quality with other
instruments|British legal origin and English language|column (1) shows that log European settler
mortality is excludable from the main regression. The overidenti¯cation tests also show that the
instruments are valid. We use Hansen's overidenti¯cation test (J-test) to check the null hypothesis
41This is similar to the ¯rst stage regression in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), where they regress the
average risk of expropriation (which is one the components of our index of institutions) on log settler mortality. Their
estimated coe±cient is -0.61 (0.13) with an R
2 of 0.27.
20of whether the instruments for institutions we choose are valid. P-values for the overidenti¯cation
test are reported in panel C. We cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are appropriate
since all of p-values far exceed the conventional 5% signi¯cance level.
5 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper has been to analyze empirically the role of di®erent theoretical ex-
planations behind the lack of °ows of capital from rich countries to poor ones. We undertake a
systematic empirical study to evaluate the role of the alternative explanations behind the \Lucas
Paradox," which include di®erences in fundamentals and capital market imperfections. Our em-
pirical evidence shows that for the period 1970¡2000, institutional quality is the leading causal
variable explaining the \Lucas Paradox."
Our ¯ndings also generate implications for the patters of international °ows during the last
century. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) characterize four di®erent periods in terms of the \U-shaped"
evolution of capital mobility. An upswing in capital mobility occurred from 1880 to 1914 during the
Gold Standard period. Before 1914, capital movements were free and °ows reached unprecedented
levels. The international ¯nancial markets broke up during World War I. In the 1920s, policymakers
around the world tried to reconstruct the international ¯nancial markets. Britain returned to the
gold standard in 1925 and led the way to restoring the international gold standard for a short
period. Capital mobility increased between 1925 and 1930. As the world economy collapsed into
depression in the 1930s, so did the international capital markets. World War II was followed by
a period of limited capital mobility. Capital °ows began to increase starting in the 1960s, and
further expanded in the 1970s after the demise of the Bretton Woods system. In terms of the
\Lucas Paradox," Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) argue that capital was somewhat biased towards the
rich countries in the ¯rst global capital market boom in pre-1914, but it is even more so today. If
the \Lucas Paradox" characterized to a certain extent the pre-1914 global capital market, and if it
persists today to the extent that poorer countries receive even less °ows than during the pre-1914
boom, what is the explanation? We argue that it is di®erences in institutional quality among the
poor and rich countries.
The \Lucas Paradox" has received a lot of attention as the di®erent explanations behind the
puzzle have di®erent and sometimes opposite policy responses. Our results suggest that policies
aimed at strengthening the protection of property rights, reducing corruption, increasing govern-
ment stability, bureaucratic quality and law and order should be at the top of the list of policy
makers seeking to increase capital in°ows to poor countries. Recent studies emphasize the role of
21institutions in achieving higher levels of income, but they remain silent on the speci¯c mechanisms.
Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions a®ect
long-run development.
226 Appendices
A Data Descriptions and Sources
In°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita (IMF): 1970¡2000. Data on in°ows of
direct and portfolio equity investment are from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (lines
78bed and 78bmd respectively). In°ows are expressed in constant 1996 U.S. dollars. Direct invest-
ment (line 78bed) includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and ¯nancial derivatives
associated with various intercompany transactions between a±liated enterprises. Excluded are in-
°ows of direct investment capital into the reporting economy for exceptional ¯nancing, such as
debt-for-equity swaps. Equity liabilities (line 78bmd) include shares, stock participation, and sim-
ilar documents that usually denote ownership of equity.
For conversion to per capita terms the mid-year total population is used.
Stocks of Foreign Capital (KLSV): 1970¡1997. Foreign claims on domestic capital in 1990 con-
stant U.S. dollars, from Kraay, Loayza, Serven, and Ventura (2000, 2005). The authors construct
estimates of stocks of foreign capital using initial stocks and in°ows of direct and portfolio invest-
ment and adjust the capital stock to re°ect the e®ects of changes in market prices and exchange
rates according to Sit = VitSit¡1+Fit, where Sit denotes the initial stock of the asset in country i at
the end of period t in constant 1990 U.S. dollars; Fit the in°ow of new investment in constant 1990
U.S. dollars; and Vit the gross change between periods t-1 and t in the value of the asset. The gross









; where ± = 0.06
is the depreciation rate; Pt is the U.S. price level; eit is the exchange rate in local currency units
per U.S. dollars; and PI is the investment de°ator in country i at time t. The authors argue that
in principle, one would like the capital stock to be measured at market value. An obvious choice
would be to proxy changes in the value of capital by changes in a share price index. The authors
argue against this approach because capital listed on the stock market, especially in developing
countries, is not representative of the stock of capital. Moreover, in thin markets, the link between
changes in share prices and the underlying value of ¯rms is tenuous. Thus, the authors consider
replacement cost, and proxy changes in this by the change in the local currency investment de°ator.
Data on initial stocks were taken from the IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics and OECD's (1972)
\Stocks of Private Direct Investment by DAC countries in Developing Countries End 1967." For
countries for which no stock information is available, they infer initial stocks as the ratio of the °ow
of investment in that asset relative to the gross domestic investment, multiplied by the domestic
capital stock. In order to smooth out year-to-year deviations, they use the average investment
23ratio in the ¯rst three years for which °ow data is available. In most cases for portfolio equity
investment, the observed initial °ows are zero, and so this results in an estimate of a zero initial
stock. In°ows data on direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities were taken from the IMF,
IFS statistics.
Stocks of Foreign Capital (LM): 1970¡1998. Foreign claims on domestic capital, from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001). The authors construct estimates of stocks of equity and foreign direct in-
vestment using initial stock data and in°ow data adjusted to re°ect the e®ect of changes in market
prices and exchange rates.
Stock measures of portfolio equity liabilities (EQL) are constructed based on cumulative equity
in°ows, taken from the IMF's IFS and BOPS. For equity in°ows, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti adjust
the stock outstanding at the end of year t-1 for changes in the value of the stock market in U.S.
dollar terms between the end of the year t-1 and the end of the year t. The °ows are assumed
to occur uniformly during the year and thus their end of year value was calculated by multiplying
them by the ratio of the stock market value in U.S. dollars at the end of the year (p*) over its




¹ p¤t. In°ows data on portfolio
equity liabilities were taken from the IMF, IFS statistics as described above. Stock measures are
taken from the International Investment Position (IIP) data published by BOPS and IFS.
The stock value of foreign direct investment liabilities (FDIL) is obtained by cumulating the dol-
lar amount of yearly in°ows (including reinvested pro¯ts) adjusted for variations in the price of
capital. Instead of assuming that FDI is in the form of investment in some standardized \ma-
chinery" whose price in dollar terms follows the price of capital in the U.S. (i.e. the price of
capital goods increases at the same rate regardless of location), the authors assume that capi-
tal goods are closer to non-traded goods and that the relative price of investment goods across
countries follows relative CPIs. These assumptions imply that the change in the domestic price
of capital goods is the sum of the change in the relative price of capital between the country and




t ) + ¢FDILt, where rerus is the country's real exchange rate
vis-a-vis the US dollar, and an increase measures an appreciation; and ¼k is the rate of change of
the price of capital in U.S. dollars. The estimates of stocks of FDI according to this methodology,
however, can overstate the actual stock of FDI because a) write-o®s of existing capital are not taken
into account,42 and b) given accounting practices, in the presence of in°ation, nominal depreciation
allowances imply that part of reinvested pro¯ts are o®setting real capital depreciation and should
42Notice that the formula does not include a depreciation term or allowances for when a machine becomes obsolete.
24not be counted as capital. The in°ation adjustment to the stock implies instead that each dollar
of reinvested pro¯ts is calculated in \real" terms. In order to address these problems, the authors
compute the measure of FDI capital based on the above formula but without any correction for
in°ation in capital goods' prices, FDILt = FDILt¡1
rerust
rerust¡1 + ¢FDILt. In°ows data on direct
investment were taken from the IMF, IFS statistics as described above. The initial values for
stocks were taken from from the IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, OECD's (1972) \Stocks of
Private Direct Investment by DAC countries in Developing Countries End 1967" and Sinn (1990)
\Net External Asset Position of 145 Countries: Estimation and Interpretation." When stocks were
unavailable, the authors use cumulative in°ows using data back to the 1950s.
The data in current U.S. dollars is converted into constant 1996 U.S. dollars by using the U.S. CPI
in 1996.
In°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita out of KLSV and LM stock data: These
in°ows are obtained by ¯rst di®erencing the stocks estimates of KLSV and LM. For conversion to
per capita terms, the mid-year total population is used.
Population: 1970¡2000. Total population from from World Bank, World Development Indicators
(2004).
Consumer price index (CPI): U.S. CPI with base year 1996 = 1 is from World Bank, World Devel-
opment Indicators (2004).
GDP per capita in 1970 in PPP 1996 U.S. dollars: Gross Domestic Product in purchasing power
parity 1996 U.S. dollars, from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table
(PWT) Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CI-
CUP), October 2002.
GDP per capita in 1970 in constant U.S. dollars: Gross domestic product from World Bank, World
Development Indicators (2004). We adjust the base years by using U.S. CPI, depending on the
base year of the in°ows (1990 for the KLSV data and 1996 for the IMF and LM data).
Institutional Quality: 1984¡2000. This is a composite index, which is the sum of all yearly rating
components from International Country Risk Guide, The PRS Group. The index is re-scaled to
range from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Composite index contains the following
sub-components:
² Government Stability. The government's ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its
ability to stay in o±ce. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score means lower
risk.
² Investment Pro¯le. This is an assessment of factors a®ecting the risk to investment that are
not covered by other political, economic and ¯nancial risk components. It is the sum of three
25subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points.
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.
The subcomponents are: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Pro¯ts Repatriation, Payment
Delays.
² Internal Con°ict. Political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on
governance. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score means lower risk.
² External Con°ict. Assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government from foreign
action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid,
trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent external pressure (cross-
border con°icts to all-out war). Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score
means lower risk.
² Non-corruption Index. Assessment of corruption within the political system. Average yearly
rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
² Non-militarized Politics. Protection from the military involvement in politics. Average yearly
rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
² Protection from Religious Tensions. Protection from the religious tensions in society. Average
yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
² Law and Order. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality
of the legal system; the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the
law. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
² Protection from Ethnic Tensions. Assessment of the degree of tension within a country at-
tributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12,
where a higher score means lower risk.
² Democratic Accountability. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means
lower risk. In general, the highest number of risk points is assigned to alternating democracies,
while the lowest number of risk points is assigned to authoritarian regimes.
² Quality of Bureaucracy. Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock
absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Average yearly
rating from 0 to 4, where a higher score means lower risk.
Years of Schooling: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999. Average years of secondary, higher
and total schooling in the total population. Data from Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000),
International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications. Center for International
Development at Harvard University (CID).
Distantness: 1970¡2000. Variable constructed as the weighted average of the distances in thousands
of kms from the capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of the other countries,
26using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights, averages across a particular time pe-
riod. In symbols: denoting the distance from country i's capital city to country j's capital city by
dij, country i's distantness is de¯ned as 1
T §T
t=1§jdijgdpt
j=gdpt where gdpt is the year t group-wide
(total) GDP, and T is the sample length. Pair-wise distance is taken from Arcview 3.x software.
Restrictions to Capital Mobility: 1971¡2000, The mean value of four dummy variables: 1) Ex-
change Arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or all capital transactions and/or some or
all invisibles; 2) Payments restrictions on payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restric-
tions on payments for capital transactions; 4) Surrender or Repatriation Requirements for Export
Proceeds. From International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions.
Additional controls used in the robustness analysis:
In°ation Volatility: 1970¡1997. The standard deviation of annual Consumer Price Index (CPI)
percentage change divided by the average of the annual in°ation over the particular time period,
from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Corporate Tax Rate: 1997. Corporate tax rates from KPMGs Corporate Tax Rates Survey avail-
able at http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/global tax/ctr survey/.
Trade Openness: 1971¡1997. Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
share of GDP from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
FDI Incentives: 1990¡1997. Index on incentives to FDI, constructed by Wei (2000). Wei (2000)
converts the textual information in the PwC reports on FDI incentives into numerical codes. For
the measurement of incentives, a variable was created based on the presence or absence of restric-
tions in: 1) existence of special incentives for foreigners to invest in certain industries or certain
geographic areas; 2) tax concessions speci¯c to foreign ¯rms (including tax holidays and tax re-
bates, but excluding concessions for export promotion); 3) non-tax concessions such as tax grants,
subsidized loans and reduced rent; 4) special promotion for exports.
FDI Restrictions: 1990¡1997. Index on restrictions to FDI constructed by Wei (2000). Wei (2000)
converts the textual information in the PwC reports into numerical codes. For the measurement of
restrictions, a variable was created based on the presence or absence of restrictions in: 1) exchange
controls; 2) exclusion of foreign ¯rms from certain strategic sectors (in particular, national defense
and the mass media); 3) exclusion of foreign ¯rms from other sectors where their presence would be
considered harmless in most developed countries; 4) restriction on the share of foreign ownership.
27The overall restriction index is the sum of these variables.
Paved Roads: 1990¡1997. The percent of paved roads in total. Paved roads are those surfaced
with crushed stone (macadam) and hydrocarbon binder, with concrete or with cobblestones. Data
from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Bank Assets: 1970¡1997. Claims on domestic real non¯nancial sector by deposit money banks as
a share of GDP from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, (2005), A New Database on Financial Devel-
opment and Structure.
Stock Market Value Traded: 1970¡1997. Total shares traded on the stock market exchange as a
share of GDP from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, (2005), A New Database on Financial Develop-
ment and Structure.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP): 1970¡1997. TFP is estimated as Solow residual from the neo-
classical production function, y = Ak®, as y=k® where y is GDP per capita, k is domestic capital
stock per capita, and ® = 0:3.
Capital Stock per capita in 1970: Domestic capital stock including gold reserves per capita in 1970
expressed in constant 1990 U.S. dollars, from Kraay, Loayza, Serven, and Ventura (2000) taken
from Summers and Heston Penn World Tables Version 5.6. For conversion to per capita terms the
mid-year total population is used.
Oil Dummy: A dummy for the major oil-exporting countries. Included are Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) members (Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela) as well as Bahrain, Ecuador,
Gabon, and Oman.
Malaria: 1994. The proportion of a country's population at risk of falciparum malaria transmission
from Arthur, John W. and Je®rey D. Sachs, (2000).
Sovereign Risk Moody's: 1990¡1997. An index based on Moody's sovereign ratings (foreign cur-
rency, country ceiling for bonds and notes). Index numbers recoded from letter scores from 1 (AAA,
lowest risk) to 24 (C, highest risk).
Sovereign Risk S&P: 1990¡1997. An index based on Standard&Poor's long term foreign currency
denominated sovereign debt ratings. Index numbers recoded from letter scores from 1 (AAA, lowest
risk) to 23 (Serial Default, highest risk).
Reuters: 1987¡2000. Number of times a country is mentioned in Reuters. Source is Reuters
database from Doug Bond, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, (2001), Integrated Data for Events Analysis
(IDEA) project, Harvard University.
Foreign Bank Asset Share: 1990¡1997. The share of foreign bank assets in total banking sector
28assets from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, (2005), A New Database on Financial Development and
Structure. Original data are from IBCA's BankScope database. A foreign bank is de¯ned as foreign
if at least 50% of the equity is owned by foreigners.
Legal origin: Origin of formal legal code in the country: English common-law, French civil law, Ger-
man civil law, and Scandinavian civil law from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997, 1998).
English Language: Fraction of the population speaking English as a mother tongue, from Hall and
Jones (1999).
European settlers' mortality: Historical European settlers' mortality rates from Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2001). Mortality rates are measured in terms of deaths per annum per 1000
\mean strength" (raw mortality numbers are adjusted to what they would be if a force of 1000
living people were kept in place for a whole year, e.g., it is possible for this number to exceed 1000
in episodes of extreme mortality as those who die are replaced with new arrivals).
29B Samples
\Whole World" Sample. IMF Flows Data (98 Countries)
Albania (ALB), Algeria (DZA), Angola (AGO), Argentina (ARG), Armenia (ARM), Australia (AUS), Aus-
tria (AUT), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BGD), Belarus (BLR), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA), Bulgaria
(BGR), Burkina Faso (BFA), Cameroon (CMR), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), Colombia (COL), Congo
(COG), Costa Rica (CRI), Cote d'Ivore (CIV), Croatia (HRV), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Rep. (CZE), Den-
mark (DNK), Dominican Rep. (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), El Salvador (SLV), Estonia (EST),
Ethiopia (ETH), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Gabon (GAB), Gambia (GMB), Germany (DEU), Ghana
(GHA), Greece (GRC), Guatemala (GTM), Guinea (GIN), Guyana (GUY), Haiti (HTI), Honduras (HND),
Hungary (HUN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Iran (IRN), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Jamaica (JAM),
Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Kenya (KEN), Korea (KOR), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania
(LTU), Madagascar (MDG), Malaysia (MYS), Mali (MLI), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Mozambique
(MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Nicaragua (NIC), Niger (NER), Nige-
ria (NGA), Norway (NOR), Oman (OMN), Pakistan (PAK), Panama (PAN), Papua New Guinea (PNG),
Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Portugal (PRT), Russia (RUS), Saudi Arabia (SAU),
Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE), Singapore (SGP), Slovenia (SVN), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP),
Sweden (SWE), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), Uganda (UGA), Ukraine
(UKR), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Uruguay (URY), Vietnam (VNM), Zambia (ZMB),
Zimbabwe (ZWE).
\Base" Sample. IMF Flows Data (81 Countries)
All from corresponding \whole world" sample except for Albania (ALB), Algeria (DZA), Angola (AGO),
Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZE), Burkina Faso (BFA), Cote d'Ivore (CIV), Ethiopia (ETH), Gabon
(GAB), Guinea (GIN), Kazakhstan (KAZ), Madagascar (MDG), Namibia (NAM), Nigeria (NGA), Oman
(OMN), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Vietnam (VNM).
\Whole World" Sample. KLSV Flows Data (61 Countries)
Algeria (DZA), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA), Cameroon
(CMR), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Congo (COG), Costa Rica (CRI),
Cote d'Ivore (CIV), Denmark (DNK), Dominican Rep. (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), El Sal-
vador (SLV), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Guatemala (GTM), Honduras
(HND), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Iran (IRN), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Jamaica (JAM),
Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Nether-
lands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Nicaragua (NIC), Norway (NOR), Oman (OMN), Pakistan (PAK), Peru
(PER), Philippines (PHL), Portugal (PRT), Senegal (SEN), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka
(LKA), Sweden (SWE), Syria8 (SYR), Thailand (THA), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN),
Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN).
30\Base" Sample. KLSV Flows Data (58 Countries)
All from corresponding \whole world" sample except for Algeria (DZA), Cote d'Ivore (CIV), Oman (OMN).
\Base" Sample for IV. KLSV Flows Data (34 Countries)
Australia (AUS), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Brazil (BRA), Cameroon (CMR), Canada (CAN), Chile
(CHL), Colombia (COL), Congo (COG), Costa Rica (CRI), Dominican Rep. (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt
(EGY), El Salvador (SLV), Guatemala (GTM), Honduras (HND), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Jamaica
(JAM), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), New Zealand (NZL), Nicaragua (NIC), Pakistan
(PAK), Peru (PER), Senegal (SEN), South Africa (ZAF), Sri Lanka (LKA), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO),
Tunisia (TUN), United States (USA), Uruguay (URY), and Venezuela (VEN).
\Whole World" Sample. LM Flows Data (60 Countries)
Algeria (DZA), Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Bolivia (BOL), Botswana (BWA), Brazil
(BRA), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), Cote d'Ivore
(CIV), Denmark (DNK), Dominican Rep. (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), El Salvador (SLV),
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Guatemala (GTM), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Israel
(ISR), Italy (ITA), Jamaica (JAM), Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR), Korea (KOR), Kuwait (KWT), Malaysia
(MYS), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Oman
(OMN), Pakistan (PAK), Panama (PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Portugal
(PRT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Singapore (SGP), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka (LKA), Swe-
den (SWE), Syria8 (SYR), Thailand (THA), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR),
United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA), Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN), Zimbabwe (ZWE).
\Base" Sample. LM Flows Data (56 Countries)
All from corresponding \whole world" sample except for Algeria (DZA), Cote d'Ivore (CIV), Morocco (MAR),
Oman (OMN).
31C Regression Diagnostics
We performed a series of tests and simulation exercises in order to show that our results are not
spurious due to the high correlation between GDP per capita and institutional quality variables.
The tests are performed using the KLSV \base" sample of 58 countries.
C.1 Monte Carlo Exercise
We ¯rst take the two key explanatory variables: log of GDP per capita PPP in 1970 (log GDP per
capita) and average institutional quality, 1984{1997 (institutions). We generate a random sample
for each variable, where the size is equal to our actual sample and where the means, standard
deviations and correlations correspond to those of the actual data of 58 countries as shown in table
1 and table 3. The mean and standard deviation for the institutions variable are, respectively, 6.9
and 1.6. The mean and standard deviation for the log of GPD per capita are, respectively, 8.2 and
0.8. The correlation between log of GDP per capita and institutions is 0.84.
We then generate an arti¯cial dependent variable, ~ F, average in°ows of capital per capita, by
calculating,
~ Fi = ¹0 + ®0 log ~ Yi + ¯0~ Ii + ~ "i (8)
where ¹0 is a constant, ~ Yi is the randomly generated log of GDP per capita, ~ Ii is the randomly
generated institutional quality and ~ "i is a random error term. The constant was chosen so that
the randomly generated dependent variable would end up having roughly the same value as the
dependent variable in table 7. This assumption, however, is immaterial for the results. The
coe±cients on log GDP per capita and institutions were chosen to be equal to 2.0. The error term
~ "'s standard deviation was chosen to be that of the in°ows per capita variable in table 1.
We then regress ~ Fi on ~ Yi and ~ Ii using OLS. This exercise is repeated 500 times. Panels A and
B in table C-1 show the randomly generated data to have the same characteristics as the original
data. Panel C presents the properties of the estimated coe±cients using the randomly generated
data. The average value of log GDP per capita across the 500 regressions is 2.3, close to the value
of 2. The average value of institutions, 2.1, is also close to its true value of 2. In this exercise, only
in 31 out of 500 cases (6 %), we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coe±cient on log GDP per
capita is equal to 0.0 but we do reject the hypothesis that the coe±cient on institutions is 0.0. So
only 6% of the time our inference is that institutions matter and GDP per capita does not, even
though the exercise assumes both of them matter equally.
32We repeated the exercise incorporating randomly generated values for the other right hand side
variables, such as, log years of schooling, and log distantness. The coe±cients for years of schooling
and log distantness were chosen to re°ect the estimated values seen in table 7, hence, we chose 0.0
for both of them. We obtained similar results. In this case, we ¯nd that in 29 out of 500 cases
(5.8%), we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coe±cient on log GDP per capita is equal to 0.0
but we do reject the hypothesis the coe±cient on institutions is 0.0.
These results suggest that our results are not spurious due to the highly correlated variables.
C.2 Perturbation Exercise
We performed another numerical exercise following Beaton, Rubin, and Barone (1976). We create
a random sample (perturbed data) by adding an error term to the original (unperturbed) data.
We then analyzed whether these perturbed data of possible exact values of the original data yield
similar results to the ones obtained from the original unperturbed data.
We take the main variables, log GDP per capita PPP in 1970 (log GDP per capita) and average
institutional quality (institutions). Beaton, Rubin, and Barone (1976) generate a plausible set
of the independent variables by adding a rectangular (uniformly) distributed random number E
between -0.5 and + 0.499 in the digit after the last published digit. The new perturbed data are
then exactly the same as the published set if rounded to the published number of digits.
In the regression analysis, we use the log of GDP per capita, instead of the original published
non-log data. Hence, we ¯rst ¯rst round the log of GDP per capita to one decimal point. We
then add a rectangular distributed random number between -0.5 and +.499 in the digit after the
¯rst (rounded) decimal point. Also, given that our index of institutions is an average over the
sample period, in principle we can obtain more than one decimal point for the original data. We
¯rst round our institutional quality indicator to the ¯rst decimal point and then add a uniform
distributed random number between ¡0:5 and +0:499 in the digit after the ¯rst (rounded) decimal
point. Following Beaton, Rubin and Barone (1976), we ignore all errors in the dependent variable.
We run a regression with these \perturbed" data on the right hand side and store the values of
the coe±cients.
Fi = ¹00 + ®00 log(Yi + E) + ¯00(Ii + E) + "00
i (9)
where E denotes the added rounding error term. We repeated this exercise 1000 times. Table
33C-2 presents the unperturbed (original) solution.43 We then show the mean, median and standard
deviation of the \perturbed" coe±cients. We also present the lowest and highest value. The \per-
centage agreement" is the percentage of the perturbed coe±cients that agree with the unperturbed
solution to at least one digit.44 We also show the result of the test of equal means. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the unperturbed solution is the average of all solutions for these equally
likely data sets. We show the Plim value and the t-test that the Plim value equals the unperturbed
solution.45 Figure C-1 shows the Monte Carlo distribution of \perturbed" coe±cients. We repeated
the exercise using all the main right hand side variables and got similar results. Overall our results
are robust to adding a perturbation error.
C.3 Conditioning Index
As shown by Belsley (1991), one can calculate a condition index as a mean for determining when
there are collinear relations among the columns of a data matrix X. The condition index equals
to the square root of the largest eigenvalue divided by the smallest eigenvalue. When there is no
collinearity at all, the eigenvalues and the condition index will all be equal to 1. As collinearity
increases, eigenvalues will be both greater and smaller than 1, where eigenvalues close to zero
indicating a multicollinearity problem, thus condition index will increase. Belsley shows that if the
condition index is bigger than 15 then multicollinearity is a concern and if it is greater than 30 it
is a very serious concern.
We calculate the condition indices for the regression shown in column (4) of table 5 and column
(4) of table 7. The indices are 14.6 and 12.6 respectively, indicating that multicollinearity is not a
concern for our results.
43The di®erence between the values of table C-2 and table 7 are due to the fact that in this exercise we rounded
the data to one decimal point.
44Let U be the unperturbed solution and P be a perturbed solution; then P is said to agree with U if P falls within
the interval U+-¯ve units in the second signi¯cant digit of U.
45The Plim can be thought as the center of the distribution of the perturbed coe±cients assuming a large sample
size.
34D Robustness Checks
One source of endogeneity can come from the possibility that both in°ows and institutional quality
might be determined by an omitted third factor. We believe the extensive robustness analysis
undertaken in this section shows this not to be the case.
Table D-1 shows the results of adding extra control variables. Some of our robustness variables
are available for only the 1990s; therefore corresponding regressions are only for the 1990s. Column
(1) investigates the role of log average in°ation volatility, which captures average macroeconomic
instability. This variable turns out to be insigni¯cant. Because the lack of °ows can be due to
heavy taxation, we also add corporate income tax as another policy variable. As shown in column
(2), our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable.46 Institutional quality remains positive
and signi¯cant. Another variable that might play a role is trade.47 As shown in column (3), our
results are robust to the inclusion of average trade openness de¯ned as the sum of exports and
imports as a share of output. The institutional quality variable remains highly signi¯cant. Trade,
however, has no e®ect.48 Columns (4) and (5), respectively, test for the e®ects of restrictions and
incentives to FDI. The restriction index is the sum of four dummies for exchange controls, exclusion
of foreign ¯rms from certain strategic sectors, exclusion of foreign ¯rms from other non-strategic
sectors, and restriction on the share of foreign ownership.49 The incentive index is a dummy for
incentives for foreigners to invest in speci¯c industries or geographic areas.50 Only the incentive
index enter signi¯cantly. The role of institutional quality, on the other hand, remains positive and
signi¯cant. As seen in column (6), the results are robust to using variables that proxy government
infrastructure. We use the percentage of paved roads in total roads, averaged over the sample period,
as a measure of infrastructure. Because of complementarities between public and private capital, the
former can be considered another potential omitted factor of production that a®ects the productive
opportunities in an economy. The e®ect of this variable is positive, but not signi¯cant. We also
46This variables is available for the 1990s only. In addition, the signi¯cance of this variable is not robust to our
other samples. Hence we decided not to include it as a main explanatory variable.
47Mundell (1957) shows commodity movements and factor movements to be substitutes. Markusen (1983) and
Svensson (1984) show that, whether trade and factor mobility are complements or substitutes, depends on the
assumptions made with respect to factor intensities, technology, and preferences.
48Lane (2004) ¯nds a positive association between trade openness and the level of external debt. He argues that
this result supports theories of constrained access to international credit markets.
49Since this variable includes a capital controls component, we also use this index without our restrictions to capital
mobility variable, obtaining similar results.
50We also used the other incentive variables, namely tax concessions, non-tax concessions, special promotion for
exports and got similar results. These indices were coded by Wei (2000) following a detailed description compiled
by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Corporate tax rate is also from Wei. Unfortunately these variables are available only
for one year, where that year changes between 1990¡1997 from country to country. Hence we decided not to include
them among the main explanatory variables.
35use ¯nancial market development as another variable that represents good domestic fundamentals.
In theory, higher levels of ¯nancial development lead to higher productivity of capital.51 We try
several standard measures of credit market development, namely liquid liabilities of the ¯nancial
system, total credit to private sector, and credit by deposit money banks to private sector (all as
shares of GDP, averaged over the sample period). We report the result with bank credit in column
(7). We also try measures of capital market development. We use stock market capitalization
(shown in column (8)) and total value traded on the stock market (as shares of GDP, averaged over
the sample period). Both turn out to be insigni¯cant. Inclusion of these measures together with
the credit market variables and/or on their own did not change the overall picture.
Table D-2 looks at some other indicators. As explained before, it is hard to separate the e®ects
of the incentive structure (institutions) on the adoption of new technologies from the TFP itself.
Hence it may be the case that our institutional quality variable is a proxy for TFP di®erences.
However, we do not have a good measure that captures international TFP di®erences given the
fact that technology can be transferred and imitated. Hence the empirical literature on growth
tends to calculate TFP measures as a residual of growth rates minus factor accumulation weighted
by their relative contribution to production. We also construct a similar proxy variable for TFP
by solving for A in equation (1) and assuming the value of ® = 1=3. We also calculate TFP growth
rates calculated as the growth rate of per capita output minus one third of the growth rate of the
per capita capital stock. We calculate both of these variables for every year and every country in
our sample period. As seen in column (1), average level of TFP growth has an insigni¯cant e®ect.
The results with the TFP growth rate are the same. If we use these variables alone both turn out
to be positive and signi¯cant. Our institutional quality variable remains positive and signi¯cant.
We repeat the analysis using capital stock per capita instead of GDP per capita as a measure of
the \Lucas Paradox" as shown in column (2). Neoclassical theory suggests that capital will °ow
from the capital abundant country to the capital scarce country. From another point of view,
this exercise also can be viewed as evidence for the presence of externalities in the localization of
production; capital goes where capital is. We use the 1970 value of the domestic capital stock per
capita since this will be the relevant value for the future in°ows. As shown in column (2) of table
D-2, the results are very similar. Institutional quality remains the main explanation for the \Lucas
Paradox." If capital stock is used on its own it turns out to be positive and signi¯cant. We also
51Note that ¯nancial market development can also be considered a measure of asymmetric information as it mit-
igates information problems. In a standard frictionless general equilibrium model a la Arrow-Debreu ¯nancial in-
termediaries are redundant. Information asymmetries or transaction costs are required to justify the existence of
¯nancial intermediaries.
36used an oil country dummy, a Sub-Saharan country dummy and existence of Malaria, all of which
turns out to be insigni¯cant.
We also experiment with some other variables for fundamentals. For example, we use land
because it can be another potential omitted factor of production such as human capital and hence
countries with less land may have low marginal productivity of capital. This variable turns out
to be insigni¯cant and thus we do not report the results. We also use ratio of external debt to
GDP, which turns out to be insigni¯cant, and hence not reported. Our capital control measure is
an average of four dummy variables as explained before. We try two of these measures on their
own: restrictions on payments for capital transactions and surrender or repatriation requirements
for export proceeds. The results are qualitatively the same and therefore not reported.
The institutional quality variable is a composite index of the various components. We use
each component of this index independently to see which ones are driving the result. Government
stability, internal con°ict, non-corruption, law and order, democratic accountability, bureaucratic
quality, and investment pro¯le seem to be important determinants of capital in°ows. Other com-
ponents such as external con°ict, non-militarized politics, and protection from religious tensions
turn out to be insigni¯cant. We do not report these results for the space considerations.52
In table D-3, to test the robustness of the results obtained using the distantness variable as
a measure of asymmetric information, we try several other measures for asymmetric information.
First as shown in columns (1) and (2), we use the sovereign debt ratings, from Standard and
Poor's (S&P), and Moody's as a measure of sovereign risk. These data re°ect the assessment of
each government's capacity and willingness to repay debt according to its terms. S&P's appraisal
of each sovereign's creditworthiness is based on economic and ¯nancial performance and political
factors. They observe that \willingness to repay is a qualitative issue that distinguishes sovereigns
from most other types of issuers. Partly because creditors have only limited redress, a government
can (and does) default selectively on its obligations, even when it possesses the ¯nancial capacity
for timely debt service." Thus, although this measure is highly correlated with the ICRG variables,
their objective and methodology are quite di®erent. In order to eliminate any possible perception
bias, ICRG does not use any outside expert opinion, such as in°uential investors who might have
assets in the rated country. S&P, on the other hand, relies on this from time to time. These variables
turn out to be negative but not signi¯cant.53 Our institutional quality variable is robust to the
52The results are reported in the working paper version: Harvard Business School Working Paper Series, No.
05-054, 2004.
53Most emerging markets do not have a sovereign rating before the early 1990s. Hence we run this regression for
the 1990s decade only.
37inclusion of the sovereign risk variable. In column (3) we use a variable called Reuters. This variable
is the number of times the country is mentioned in Reuters. This measure should potentially re°ect
the international business community's awareness about the country that they are investing in. The
sign is positive, but the coe±cient is not signi¯cant. Then we try foreign banks (share of foreign
banks with at least 50% of foreign capital in total banks) and accounting practices (an index for
the degree of transparency in accounting) as alternative measures of asymmetric information. Both
enter with correct signs but are not signi¯cant. We also tried accounting practices from Wei (2000)
and get similar results.54 Of course all these measures are endogenous and hence distantness is our
\preferred" measure. Finally we use distantness as weighted by population instead of GDP. The
results are the same as before.
Table D-4 reports the results of our main regressions using data on total capital in°ows, including
debt from the Lane and Milessi-Feretti (LM) data set. Columns (1) and (2) repeat the results from
column (2) and (8) of table 8. Column (3) and (4) adds debt in°ows to the in°ows of direct and
portfolio equity investment making the left hand side total in°ows of capital per capita. The results
are similar.
Table D-5 repeats the analysis for the decades in our sample period. Institutional quality
remains the main explanation for the \Lucas Paradox" for the di®erent decades and subperiods, as
shown in columns (1) to (7). We conjecture that the lower signi¯cance of the institutional quality
variable during the 1980s can be accounted by the general cuto® of lending in the international
capital markets following Mexico's announcement to halt foreign interest payments on August 15,
1982, which marked the beginning of the international debt crisis.55 Notice that the ICRG data,
hence our composite institutional quality index starts in 1984. As shown in ¯gures 2and 3, our
composite index does not change much over our sample period. Thus we use the average value of
the index for the 1970s and 1980s.
54The results are reported in the working paper version: Harvard Business School Working Paper Series, No.
05-054, 2004.
55As Eichengreen and Lindert (1989) observe, during the 1980s private creditors tended to withhold capital from
potential borrowers in all developing countries, not just the conspicuous problem debtor countries.
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43Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
IMF, IFS Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 81 Countries
Average In°ows of Capital per capita, 1970{2000 117.34 170.29 {0.29 722.72
GDP per capita in 1970 (PPP 1996) 5.86 4.53 0.61 16.49
Average Institutional Quality, 1984{2000 6.94 1.50 4.31 9.69
Average Years of Schooling, 1970{2000 5.53 2.92 0.48 11.41
Average Distantness, 1970{2000 7.93 2.11 5.45 13.75
Average Restrictions to Capital Mobility, 1970{2000 0.52 0.27 0.00 0.97
KLSV Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 58 Countries
Average In°ows of Capital per capita, 1970{1997 38.57 59.27 {29.32 181.16
GDP per capita in 1970 (PPP 1990) 5.17 4.07 0.85 15.74
Average Institutional Quality, 1984{1997 6.92 1.64 4.35 9.65
Average Years of Schooling, 1970{1997 5.59 2.60 1.78 11.41
Average Distantness, 1970{1997 8.16 1.96 5.75 13.50
Average Restrictions to Capital Mobility, 1970{1997 0.54 0.27 0.00 1.00
LM Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 56 Countries
Average In°ows of Capital per capita, 1970{1998 202.29 322 0.80 1309.30
GDP per capita in 1970 (PPP 1996) 6.60 5.25 0.56 23.39
Average Institutional Quality, 1984{1998 7.12 1.52 4.46 9.67
Average Years of Schooling, 1970{1998 5.83 2.44 2.00 11.41
Average Distantness, 1970{1998 8.28 2.20 5.43 13.80
Average Restrictions to Capital Mobility, 1970{1998 0.51 0.29 0.00 0.98
Notes: Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{2000 include in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment
from the IMF, IFS. The \base" sample is composed of 81 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are
available. In°ows are expressed in constant 1996 U.S. dollars. Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1997 are
the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in constant 1990 U.S. dollars, from KLSV data set. The \base" sample
is composed of 58 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are available. Average in°ows of capital
per capita, 1970{1998 are the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in constant 1996 U.S. dollars, from LM
data set. The \base" sample is composed of 56 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are available.
GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by population in 1970 in PPP basis (in 1990 U.S.
dollars or 1996 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating components from International
Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are investment pro¯le, government
stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized politics, protection from religious
tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, quality of bureaucracy. The index
ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Average years of schooling is years of total schooling
in total population, averaged over the relevant sample period. Average distantness is constructed as the weighted
average of the distances in thousands of kms from the capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of
the other countries, using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights, averaged over the relevant time
period. Average restrictions to capital mobility is the mean value of four dummy variables, averaged over the relevant
sample period: 1) Exchange arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or all capital transactions; 2) Payments
restrictions on payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restrictions on payments for capital transactions;
4) Surrender or repatriation requirements for export proceeds. See appendix A for detailed explanations of all the
variables and sources.
44Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Additional Control Variables
KLSV Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 58 Countries
Sample Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Average In°ation Volatility, 1970{1997 58 0.86 0.69 0.27 4.41
Corporate Tax Rate in 1997a 44 33.98 7.30 15.00 53.20
Average FDI Restrictions, 1990{1997b 35 1.49 0.85 0.00 3.00
Average FDI Incentives, 1990{1997b 35 1.74 0.70 0.00 3.00
Average Trade Openness, 1970{1997 58 55.38 24.68 14.83 122.28
Average Paved Roads, 1990{1997c 57 53.72 32.21 4.79 100.00
Average Bank Assets, 1970{1997 58 0.44 0.25 0.07 1.08
Average Stock Market Value Traded, 1970{1997d 50 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.46
Average TFP, 1970{1997 58 0.37 0.18 0.14 0.78
Capital Stock per capita in 1970 58 11.11 12.21 0.73 55.15
Malaria in 1994 58 0.12 0.26 0.00 1.00
Average Sovereign Risk Moody's, 1990{1997f 38 6.49 4.50 1.00 14.25
Average Sovereign Risk S&P, 1990{1997g 37 6.11 4.66 1.00 14.00
Average Reuters, 1987{1997 58 3.69 10.76 0.05 79.75
Average Foreign Banks Asset Share, 1990{1997h 49 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.42
Notes: See appendix A for the detailed explanations of the variables. Samples: 58 is the \base" sample from the KLSV
data set.
a44-country sample due to missing data on corporate tax rates.
b35-country sample due to missing data on
FDI restrictions and incentives.
c57-country sample due to missing data on paved roads for CHN.
d50-country sample
due to missing data on stock market value traded.
f38-country sample due to missing data on Moody's sovereign
ratings.
g37-country sample due to missing data on S&P's sovereign ratings.
h49-country sample due to missing data
on foreign banks assets.
45Table 3: Correlation Matrix for the Main Explanatory Variables
IMF, IFS Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 81 Countries
Log GDP percap. Institutions Log Schooling Log Distantness Ext.Restrictions
Log GDP percap. 0.84 0.81 {0.41 {0.49
Institutions 0.71 {0.41 {0.54
Log Schooling {0.29 {0.42
Log Distantness 0.18
Restrictions
KLSV Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 58 Countries
Log GDP percap. Institutions Log Schooling Log Distantness Ext.Restrictions
Log GDP percap. 0.81 0.79 {0.35 {0.62
Institutions 0.79 {0.41 {0.65
Log Schooling {0.17 {0.62
Log Distantness 0.23
Restrictions
LM Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 56 Countries
Log GDP percap. Institutions Log Schooling Log Distantness Ext.Restrictions
Log GDP percap. 0.70 0.73 {0.31 {0.61
Institutions 0.71 {0.35 {0.56
Log Schooling {0.13 {0.62
Log Distantness 0.21
Restrictions
Notes: Log GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by population in 1970 in PPP basis (in 1990
U.S. dollars or 1996 U.S. dollars). Institutions is the sum of all the rating components from International Country
Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are investment pro¯le, government stability,
internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized politics, protection from religious tensions, law
and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges from
0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Log schooling is years of total schooling in total population, averaged
over the relevant sample period. Log distantness is constructed as the weighted average of the distances in thousands
of kms from the capital city of the particular country to the capital cities of the other countries, using the total
GDP shares of the other countries as weights, averaged over the relevant time period. Restrictions is the restrictions
to capital mobility, which is the mean value of four dummy variables, averaged over the relevant sample period: 1)
Exchange arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or all capital transactions; 2) Payments restrictions on
payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restrictions on payments for capital transactions; 4) Surrender or
repatriation requirements for export proceeds. See appendix A for detailed explanations of all the variables and
sources.
46Table 4: Correlations between the Main and the Additional Control Variables
KLSV Capital Flows Data: Base Sample of 58 Countries
Log GDP percap. Institutions Log Schooling Log Distantness Ext.Restrictions
Log In°ation Volatility {0.13 {0.23 {0.07 0.31 0.02
Corporate Tax Ratea 0.28 0.25 0.15 {0.40 {0.35
FDI Restrictionsb {0.51 {0.31 {0.40 0.09 0.38
FDI Incentivesb {0.40 {0.53 {0.39 0.05 0.43
Log Trade Openness 0.02 0.08 0.10 {0.20 {0.13
Paved Roadsc 0.45 0.56 0.47 {0.62 {0.41
Log Bank Assets 0.50 0.67 0.54 {0.52 {0.47
Log Stock Marketd 0.37 0.53 0.54 {0.34 {0.37
Log TFP 0.95 0.83 0.81 {0.42 {0.63
Log Capital Stock percap. 0.95 0.86 0.82 {0.34 {0.62
Oil Dummy {0.05 {0.14 {0.14 0.15 {0.03
Malaria {0.49 {0.38 {0.45 0.23 {0.12
Sovereign Risk Moody'sf {0.69 {0.85 {0.75 0.48 0.68
Sovereign Risk S&Pg {0.76 {0.88 {0.77 0.47 0.73
Log Reuters 0.41 0.45 0.50 {0.28 {0.38
Foreign Banks Assetsh {0.38 {0.47 {0.38 0.22 0.14
Notes: See appendix A for detailed explanations of these variables and sources.
a44-country sample due to missing
data on corporate tax rates.
b35-country sample due to missing data on FDI restrictions and incentives.
c57-country
sample due to missing data on paved roads for CHN.
d50-country sample due to missing data on stock market value
traded.
f38-country sample due to missing data on Moody's sovereign ratings.
g37-country sample due to missing
data on S&P's sovereign ratings.
h49-country sample due to missing data on foreign banks assets.
47Table 5: OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita I - IMF Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1970{2000
Whole Whole Base Base Base
World World Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1970 1.05*** 0.20 1.18*** 0.14
(0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20)
Average Institutional Quality, 0.68*** 0.75*** 0.82***
1984{2000 (0.14) (0.16) (0.12)
R2 0.37 0.52 0.39 0.52 0.52
Countries 98 98 81 81 81
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. Samples: 98-country \whole world"
sample includes all the countries with data available for in°ows of capital, GDP per capita, and institutional quality,
excluding outliers and countries with population less than a million. The \base" sample is composed of 81 countries
for which all the main explanatory variables are available. Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{2000 include
in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment from the IMF, IFS. In°ows are expressed in constant 1996 U.S.
dollars. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by population in 1970 in PPP basis (in
1996 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating components from International Country
Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are investment pro¯le, government stability,
internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized politics, protection from religious tensions,
law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges
from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. See appendix A for detailed explanations of all the variables
and sources.
48Table 6: OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita II- IMF Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1970{2000
Whole Whole Whole Base Base Base Base Base
World World World Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP per capita 1.03*** 0.99*** 0.82*** 1.14*** 1.11*** 0.91*** 0.13
(PPP) in 1970 (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) (0.24) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18)
Log GDP per capita 0.20
(1996 $) in 1970 (0.15)
Average Institutional 0.65*** 0.59***
Quality, 1984{2000 (0.15) (0.14)
Log Average Years of 0.12 0.06 {0.10 {0.18
Schooling, 1970{2000 (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19)
Log Average Distantness, {0.68 {0.58 {0.29 {0.31
1970{2000 (0.69) (0.72) (0.58) (0.60)
Average Restrictions to {1.54*** {1.83*** {1.23*** {1.17***
Capital Mobility, 1970{2000 (0.53) (0.60) (0.46) (0.44)
R2 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.55
Countries 92 98 97 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. Samples: 98-country \whole world"
sample includes all countries with data available for in°ows of capital, GDP per capita, and institutional quality,
excluding outliers and countries with population less than a million. 92-country sample excludes countries with
missing human capital data. 97-country sample excludes countries with missing restrictions to capital mobility data.
The \base" sample is composed of 81 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are available. Average
in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{2000 include in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment from the IMF, IFS.
In°ows are expressed in constant 1996 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided
by population in 1970 in PPP basis (in 1996 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating
components from International Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components
are investment pro¯le, government stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized
politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability,
quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Average years of
schooling is years of total schooling in total population, averaged over the relevant sample period. Average distantness
is constructed as the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kms from the capital city of the particular
country to the capital cities of the other countries, using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights,
averaged over the relevant time period. Average restrictions to capital mobility is the mean value of four dummy
variables, averaged over the relevant sample period: 1) Exchange arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or
all capital transactions; 2) Payments restrictions on payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restrictions on
payments for capital transactions; 4) Surrender or repatriation requirements for export proceeds. See appendix A for
detailed explanations of all the variables and sources.
49Table 7: OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita - KLSV Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1970{2000
Whole Whole Base Base Base Base Base Base Base
World World Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log GDP per 4.89*** 1.19 4.87*** 0.85 3.09*** 4.53*** 3.65*** 0.36
capita (PPP) in 1970 (0.73) (0.79) (0.75) (0.83) (0.84) (0.95) (0.72) (0.83)
Log GDP per 0.55
capita (1990 $) in 1970 (0.34)
Average Institutional 2.39*** 2.54*** 2.16*** 2.02***
Quality, 1984{1997 (0.41) (0.43) (0.52) (0.45)
Log Average Years of 3.84*** 0.85 0.74
Schooling, 1970{1997 (1.34) (1.23) (1.13)
Log Average {3.54 {1.60 {0.48
Distantness, 1970{1997 (3.90) (3.33) (2.92)
Average Restrictions to {6.17*** {2.73 {2.49
Capital Mobility, 1970{1997 (2.17) (2.04) (2.09)
R2 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.65 0.66
Countries 61 61 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. Samples: 61-country \whole world"
sample includes all countries with data available for in°ows of capital, GDP per capita, and institutional quality,
excluding outliers. The \base" sample is composed of 58 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are
available. Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1997 are the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in
constant 1990 U.S. dollars, from KLSV data set. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by
population in 1970 in PPP basis (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating
components from International Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components
are investment pro¯le, government stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized
politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability,
quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Average years of
schooling is years of total schooling in total population, averaged over the relevant sample period. Average distantness
is constructed as the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kms from the capital city of the particular
country to the capital cities of the other countries, using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights,
averaged over the relevant time period. Average restrictions to capital mobility is the mean value of four dummy
variables, averaged over the relevant sample period: 1) Exchange arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or
all capital transactions; 2) Payments restrictions on payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restrictions on
payments for capital transactions; 4) Surrender or repatriation requirements for export proceeds. See appendix A for
detailed explanations of all the variables and sources.
50Table 8: OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita - LM Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1970{2000
Whole Whole Base Base Base Base Base Base Base
World World Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log GDP per 1.80*** 0.32 1.92*** 0.32 1.14*** 1.70*** 1.29*** {0.01
capita (PPP) in 1970 (0.38) (0.25) (0.40) (0.29) (0.42) (0.36) (0.40) (0.32)
Log GDP per {0.18
capita (1996 $) in 1970 (0.22)
Average Institutional 1.36*** 1.36*** 1.18*** 1.24***
Quality, 1984{1998 (0.30) (0.31) (0.34) (0.36)
Log Average Years of 2.26*** 0.21 0.35
Schooling, 1970{1998 (0.81) (1.07) (1.12)
Log Average {2.45* {1.44 {1.36
Distantness, 1970{1998 (1.41) (1.26) (1.29)
Average Restrictions to {3.25** {1.77 {1.93
Capital Mobility, 1970{1998 (1.52) (1.29) (1.28)
R2 0.27 0.51 0.29 0.51 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.53 0.53
Countries 60 60 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. Samples: 60-country \whole world"
sample includes all countries with data available for in°ows of capital, GDP per capita, and institutional quality,
excluding outliers. The \base" sample is composed of 56 countries for which all the main explanatory variables are
available. Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1998 are the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in
constant 1996 U.S. dollars, from LM data set. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by
population in 1970 in PPP basis (in 1996 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating
components from International Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components
are investment pro¯le, government stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized
politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability,
quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Average years of
schooling is years of total schooling in total population, averaged over the relevant sample period. Average distantness
is constructed as the weighted average of the distances in thousands of kms from the capital city of the particular
country to the capital cities of the other countries, using the total GDP shares of the other countries as weights,
averaged over the relevant time period. Average restrictions to capital mobility is the mean value of four dummy
variables, averaged over the relevant sample period: 1) Exchange arrangements: separate exchange rates for some or
all capital transactions; 2) Payments restrictions on payments for current transactions; 3) Payments restrictions on
payments for capital transactions; 4) Surrender or repatriation requirements for export proceeds. See appendix A for
detailed explanations of all the variables and sources.
51Table 9: OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita - KLSV Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1985{1997
(1) (2)
Institutional 4.53*** 3.60***
Quality in 1984 (0.57) (1.02)
Log GDP per 2.65
capita (PPP) in 1984 (2.64)
R2 0.59 0.59
Countries 54 54
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by White's correction of heteroscedasticity. Standard
errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. The regressions are estimated using 54 country
out of 58 country \base" sample due to missing data for BGD, IRN, NIC, and SEN in the year of 1984. Average
in°ows of capital per capita, 1985{1997 are the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in constant 1990 U.S.
dollars, from KLSV data set. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by population in 1970
in PPP basis (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating components from
International Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are investment pro¯le,
government stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized politics, protection from
religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, quality of bureaucracy.
The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. See appendix A for detailed explanations of
all the variables and sources.
52Table 10: IV Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita - KLSV Flows Data
(1) (2)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares
Average Institutional 3.76*** 10.86**
Quality, 1984{1997 (0.85) (5.34)
Log GDP per {12.65
capita (PPP) in 1970 (8.18)
Panel B: First Stage for Average Institutional Quality in 1984{1997
Log European {1.02*** {0.30*
Settler Mortality (0.19) (0.18)
Log GDP per 1.26***
capita (PPP) in 1970 (0.19)
R2 0.39 0.69
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Average Institutional 2.23*** 2.33***
Quality, 1984{1997 (0.64) (0.76)
Log GDP per {0.22
capita (PPP) in 1970 (1.01)
Countries 34 34
Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least-squares estimates, instrumenting for institutional quality using log settler
mortality; Panel B reports the corresponding ¯rst stage. Panel C reports the coe±cient from an OLS regression of the
dependent variable against average institutional quality and other controls. All regressions include a constant and are
estimated by White's correction of heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% signi¯cance. The regressions are estimated using 34 country (former colonies) out of 58 country \base" sample
due to the availability of log settler mortality data. Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1997 are the °ows of
foreign claims on domestic capital in 1990 constant U.S. dollars, from KLSV data set. GDP per capita in 1970 is the
gross domestic product divided by population in PPP basis (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the
sum of all the rating components from International Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period.
The components are investment pro¯le, government stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index,
non-militarized politics, protection from religious tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic
accountability, quality of bureaucracy. The index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Log
European settlers mortality data are from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). See table 1 and appendix A for
more detailed variable descriptions and sources.
53Table 11: Tests for Validity and Excludability of Instruments - KLSV Flows Data





Panel B: First Stage for Average Institutional Quality in 1984{1997







Panel C: Results from Overidenti¯cation Test
p-value (J test) 0.55
Countries 34
Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least-squares estimates, instrumenting for institutional quality using \other"
instruments and where log settler mortality is entered into the regression as an exogenous variable; Panel B reports the
corresponding ¯rst stage. Panel C reports the p-value for Hansen J test, where the null hypothesis is that instruments
for are valid. All regressions include a constant and are estimated by White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. The regressions are estimated using
34 country (former colonies) out of 58 country \base" sample due to the availability of log settler mortality data.
Average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1997 are the °ows of foreign claims on domestic capital in 1990 constant
U.S. dollars, from KLSV data set. GDP per capita in 1970 is the gross domestic product divided by population in PPP
basis (in 1990 U.S. dollars). Average institutional quality is the sum of all the rating components from International
Country Risk Guide, averaged over the relevant sample period. The components are investment pro¯le, government
stability, internal con°ict, external con°ict, no-corruption index, non-militarized politics, protection from religious
tensions, law and order, protection from ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, quality of bureaucracy. The
index ranges from 0 to 10, where a higher score means lower risk. Log European settlers mortality from Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001). See table 1 and appendix A for more detailed variable descriptions and sources.
54Table C-1: Monte Carlo Exercise
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
In°ows of Capital percap. 58 37.129 63.458 -127.602 184.581
Log GDP percap. 58 8.211 0.856 5.616 9.933
Institutions 58 6.913 1.656 2.193 10.473
Error Term 58 -13.120 62.245 -164.365 139.010
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
Log GDP percap. Institutions Error Term
Log GDP percap. 1.000
Institutions 0.852 1.000
Error Term 0.215 0.201 1.000
Panel C: Estimated Coe±cients
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Arti¯cial b ® 500 2.306 17.487 -54.663 52.442
Arti¯cial b ¯ 500 2.141 8.439 -24.416 24.112
tstat-arti¯cial b ® 500 0.131 1.026 -3.240 2.812
tstat-arti¯cial b ¯ 500 0.264 0.988 -2.731 2.812
Notes: We generate a random sample for each variable, where the size is equal to our actual KLSV 58 \base"
sample and the means, standard deviations and correlations correspond to those of the actual data of 58 countries.
We then generate an arti¯cial dependent variable, ~ F, average in°ows of capital per capita, by calculating, ~ Fi =
20 + 2:0log ~ Yi + 2:0~ Ii + ~ "i where ~ Yi is the randomly generated log of GDP per capita, ~ Ii is the randomly generated
institutional quality and ~ "i is a random error term. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix in panels A and B
correspond to those of the arti¯cial data. Summary statistics for arti¯cial b ® and arti¯cial b ¯ in panel C correspond to
those of the estimated coe±cients of regressing 500 times ~ Fi on ~ Yi and ~ Ii using OLS.
55Table C-2: Perturbation Exercise
Sample: 58-country base sample for the KLSV capital °ows data, 1970{1997
Log GDP percap. Institutions
Unperturbed Solution 0.811 2.547
Mean 0.808 2.548
Median 0.809 2.547
Std. Dev. 0.069 0.032
Lowest Value 0.587 2.461
Highest Value 1.000 2.645
Percent Agreement 100.0 100.0
t-value, mean=unperturbed -1.207 0.744
Plim 0.811 2.547
t-value, mean=Plim -1.213 0.761
Notes: We ¯rst generate arti¯cial data by adding a rounded error term to the variables log GDP per capita and
institutions of the 58-country sample. We then regress 1000 times the actual dependent variable, average in°ows
of capital per capita, 1970{1997, on the \perturbed" data using OLS, Fi = ¹
00 + ®
00 log(Yi + E) + ¯
00(Ii + E) + "
p
i;
where E denotes the added rounded error term. The unperturbed solution that is reported in the table corresponds
to the actual data. The rest of the summary statistics correspond to the \perturbed" coe±cients ®
00 and ¯
00. The
\percentage agreement" is the percentage of the \perturbed" coe±cients that agree with the unperturbed solution to
at least one digit. Plim is the center of the distribution of the \perturbed" coe±cients assuming a large sample size.
56Table D-1: Robustness Checks for OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita I- KLSV Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita
Time Period 1970{97 1990{97 1970{97 1990{97 1990{97 1970{97 1970{97 1970{97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP per 0.83 3.19 0.91 {3.13 {0.94 0.63 0.83 0.94
capita (PPP) in 1970 (0.85) (3.80) (0.83) (4.76) (4.65) (0.89) (0.86) (1.02)
Average Institutional 2.56*** 6.31*** 2.49*** 10.00*** 8.00** 2.46*** 2.58*** 2.34***
Quality, 1984{1997 (0.45) (2.07) (0.43) (3.28) (3.17) (0.51) (0.58) (0.55)
Log Average In°ation 0.15
Volatility, 1970{1997 (0.73)
Average Corporate Tax {0.68**
Rate, 1970{1997 (0.27)
Log Average Trade 0.83
Openness, 1970{1997 (0.87)
FDI Restrictions in 1990 {1.38
(2.30)
FDI Incentives in 1990 {4.77*
(2.67)
Average Paved Roads, 0.02
1970{1997 (0.02)
Log Average Bank Assets, {0.16
1970{1997 (1.02)
Log Average Stock Market 0.27
Value Traded, 1970{1997 (0.27)
R2 0.64 0.59 0.65 0.47 0.49 0.65 0.66 0.62
Countries 58 42a 58 33b 33b 57c 58 50d
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. See appendix A for more detailed variable
descriptions and sources.
57Table D-2: Robustness Checks for OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita II- KLSV Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita
Time Period 1970{97 1970{97 1970{97 1970{97 1994{97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP per 0.84 0.91 0.68 8.43***
capita (PPP) in 1970 (1.61) (0.84) (0.86) (3.16)
Average Institutional 2.54*** 2.44*** 2.49*** 2.55*** 8.19***
Quality, 1984{1997 (0.50) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43) (3.18)
Log Average TFP, 0.02
1970{1997 (3.48)
Log Capital Stock 0.73





Malaria in 1994 6.54
(5.53)
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.46
Countries 58 58 58 58 48a
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
a48-country sample due to missing data on the
dependent variable for the year 1994. See appendix A for more detailed variable descriptions and sources.
58Table D-3: Robustness Checks for OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita III- KLSV Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita
Time Period 1990{97 1990{97 1970{97 1990{97
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per {1.17 {2.66 0.78 0.89
capita (PPP) in 1970 (3.67) (4.65) (0.81) (3.13)
Average Institutional 8.26** 8.18** 2.44*** 6.97***
Quality, 1984{1997 (3.50) (3.46) (0.42) (2.22)
Average Sovereign Risk {0.11
Moody's, 1970{1997 (0.52)
Average Sovereign Risk {0.42
S&P, 1970-1997 (0.42)
Log Average Reuters, 0.29
1970{1997 (0.36)
Average Foreign Banks 10.65
Asset Share, 1990{1997 (6.89)
R2 0.45 0.46 0.65 0.49
Countries 36a 35b 58 49c
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
aLimited 36-country sample due to missing
data on Moody's sovereign ratings.
bLimited 35-country sample due to missing data on S&P's sovereign ratings.
cLimited 44-country sample due to missing data on foreign banks assets. See appendix A for more detailed variable
descriptions and sources.
59Table D-4: Robustness Checks for OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita - LM Flows Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita, 1970{2000
Dep.Var.: FDI and FDI and FDI, Portfolio FDI, Portfolio
Portfolio Portfolio and Debt and Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per 0.32 {0.01 0.93 0.02
capita (PPP) in 1970 (0.29) (0.32) (0.59) (0.74)
Average Institutional 1.36*** 1.18*** 3.22*** 2.41***
Quality, 1984{1998 (0.31) (0.34) (0.56) (0.61)
Log Average Years of 0.21 1.31
Schooling, 1970{1998 (1.07) (1.97)
Log Average {1.44 {8.19
Distantness, 1970{1998 (1.26) (2.24)
Average Restrictions to {1.77 {3.61
Capital Mobility, 1970{1998 (1.29) (2.03)
R2 0.51 0.53 0.70 0.70
Countries 56 56 56 56
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. See table 1 and appendix A for more
detailed variable descriptions and sources.
60Table D-5: Robustness Checks for OLS Regressions of Capital In°ows per capita by Decades- KLSV
Data
Dependent Variable is Average Capital In°ows per capita (over the relevant time period)
Time Period 1970{97 1970{95 1970{79 1980{89 1990{97 1985{97 1985{95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log GDP per capita 0.36 0.43 0.54 0.06 {1.56 {1.76 {1.98
(PPP) (initial year) (0.83) (0.90) (1.30) (1.82) (3.21) (3.09) (3.05)
Average Institutional 2.16*** 1.93*** 0.71** 0.80 4.78*** 4.40*** 4.28***
Quality (over the time period) (0.52) (0.47) (0.32) (0.49) (1.59) (1.38) (1.25)
Log Average Years of Schooling 0.85 0.60 1.78 0.36 4.51 2.89 2.19
(over the time period) (1.23) (1.21) (1.60) (1.40) (3.61) (2.53) (2.47)
Log Average Distantness {1.60 {0.38 {2.15 2.42 {11.42* {5.88 {3.62
(over the time period) (3.33) (3.76) (3.87) (4.83) (6.31) (5.34) (6.59)
Average Restrictions to Capital {2.73 {2.62 {0.23 {3.67 {7.91* {9.00*** {10.27***
Mobility (over the time period) (2.04) (2.03) (1.83) (2.38) (4.04) (3.03) (3.41)
R2 0.65 0.59 0.29 0.25 0.54 0.65 0.60
Countries 58 58 54a 57 50 54 54
Notes: All regressions include a constant and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signi¯cance. Smaller samples are due to missing
data for corresponding time period. See table 1 and appendix A for more detailed variable descriptions and sources.



















































































Rich Countries Poor Countries
 
Notes: In°ows of total equity (FDI and portfolio equity investment) divided by population are based on the IMF,
IFS data in 1996 US$. Data are for 98 countries and averaged over 5 year periods. FDI in°ows correspond to
direct investment in reporting economy (line 78bed) which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital,
and ¯nancial derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions between a±liated enterprises. Portfolio
equity in°ows correspond to equity liabilities (line 78bmd) which includes shares, stock participations, and similar
documents that usually denote ownership of equity. Rich countries include 23 high GDP per capita countries that
are classi¯ed as \rich" by the World Bank; poor countries denote the 75 remaining ones.



















































































































Government Stability Investment Profile Internal Conflict
External Conflict Non-Corruption Non-Militarized Politics
Protection from Religious Tensions Law and Order Protection from Ethnic Tensions
Democratic Accountability Quality of Bureaucracy
 
Notes: Government Stability: The government's ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in
o±ce. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score means lower risk. Investment Pro¯le: This risk rating
is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. A
score of 4 points equates to low risk. The subcomponents are: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Pro¯ts Repatriation,
Payment Delays. Internal Con°ict: Political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance.
Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score means lower risk. External Con°ict: Assessment both of
the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic
pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc.) to violent external pressure
(cross-border con°icts to all-out war). Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score means lower risk.
Non-corruption: Assessment of corruption within the political system. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a
higher score means lower risk. Non-militarized Politics: Protection from the military involvement in politics. Average
yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk. Protection from Religious Tensions: Protection
from the religious tensions in society. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower risk.
Law and Order: The law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system; the
order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a
higher score means lower risk. Protection from Ethnic Tensions: Assessment of the degree of tension within a country
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. Average yearly rating from 0 to 12, where a higher score
means lower risk. Democratic Accountability: Average yearly rating from 0 to 6, where a higher score means lower
risk. In general, the highest number of risk points is assigned to alternating democracies, while the lowest number
of risk points is assigned to authoritarian regimes. Quality of Bureaucracy: Institutional strength and quality of the
bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Average
yearly rating from 0 to 4, where a higher score means lower risk.




















































































































Government Stability Investment Profile Internal Conflict
External Conflict Non-Corruption Non-Militarized Politics
Protection from Religious Tensions Law and Order Protection from Ethnic Tensions
Democratic Accountability Quality of Bureaucracy
 
Notes: The developing countries are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Rep.
of), Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Jamaica, Korea (Rep. of), Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
64Figure 4: Conditional Correlation Plots from Regression of In°ows of Capital per capita on Insti-
tutional Quality and GDP per capita: Base Sample of 81 Countries
A. Correlation of In°ows of Capital per capita and Log GDP per capita




















GDP per capita 
B. Correlation of In°ows of Capital per capita and Institutional Quality






















Notes: In°ows are in°ows of direct and portfolio equity investment from the IMF, IFS in 1996 US$. GDP per capita
is 1996 PPP basis from PWT6.1. Panel A plots the residuals from the regression of average in°ows of capital per
capita, 1970{2000 on log of GDP per capita in 1970, the variable of interest, versus the residuals from the regression of
log of GDP per capita in 1970 on average institutional quality, 1984{2000; a constant is included in both regressions.
The line represents the ¯tted line from this regression. By Frisch-Waugh theorem, the coe±cient in this regression is
exactly the same as the coe±cient on log GDP per capita in 1970 in the multiple regression including both log GDP
per capita and institutional quality as reported in column (4) of table 5. Hence the slope of the line is 0.14. Panel B
is constructed in the same fashion with institutional quality being the variable of interest, thus the slope of the line
is 0.75.Figure 5: Conditional Correlation Plots from Regression of In°ows of Capital per capita on Insti-
tutional Quality and Log GDP per capita: Base Sample of 58 Countries
A. Correlation of In°ows of Capital per capita and Log GDP per capita
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B. Correlation of In°ows of Capital per capita and Institutional Quality





















Notes: In°ows are calculated as the di®erence in stocks of FDI and portfolio liabilities from KLSV (2000) in 1990
US$. GDP per capita is 1990 PPP basis from KLSV (2000). Panel A plots the residuals from the regression of
average in°ows of capital per capita, 1970{1997 on log of GDP per capita in 1970, the variable of interest, versus the
residuals from the regression of log of GDP per capita in 1970 on average institutional quality, 1984{1997; a constant
is included in both regressions. The line represents the ¯tted line from this regression. By Frisch-Waugh theorem,
the coe±cient in this regression is exactly the same as the coe±cient on log GDP per capita in 1970 in the multiple
regression including both log GDP per capita and institutional quality as reported in column (4) of table 7. Hence
the slope of the ¯tted line is 0.85. Panel B is constructed in the same fashion with institutional quality being the
















































Notes: Figure displays the histogram of the distribution of \perturbed" coe±cients from running the following





i , where E denotes the added rounded error term (a
rectangular distributed random number between -0.5 and +.499 in the digit after the ¯rst rounded decimal point).
The unperturbed solution (vertical line) corresponds to the respective estimated coe±cients using the actual data.
The \normal line" is smoothing the distribution of 1000 observations.
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